There exists a sizable group of voters who were undecided and who chose PiS in 2019 and supported President Andrzej Duda in 2020. If these voters align with PiS again, the party stands a real chance of securing a third term. When it comes to drawing in new supporters, the political climate is so polarized that even if the opposition were offered multi‑billion zloty programs, many voters would resist changing their established preferences. This perspective comes from Norbert Maliszewski, a professor and a senior official involved with the prime minister’s office and the Government Analyses Center, in an interview with wPolityce.pl portal.
wPolityce.pl reported that Andrzej Gajcy cited internal PiS polls suggesting current support near 36 percent, with potential gains above 40 percent in the election. The question arises whether such research exists in practice.
As a minister in the prime minister’s chancellery, Maliszewski notes that he does not conduct party polls, but highlights the latest social tracking poll referenced by the wPolityce.pl portal. This poll places PiS at about 38 percent. When averaging across polls, excluding the most recent Kantar data, Politico’s analytics suggest a 37 percent level of support among strong voters. This indicates a stable PiS base of roughly 37–38 percent among those most engaged. Considering undecided and passive voters, a substantial share previously voted for PiS in 2019, now waiting to decide. If those voters were to choose, the party would face challenges, yet those who would vote for PiS if compelled to choose today are still within the PiS fold. The hope is that, in a changing environment—whether the opposition governs or PiS faces a difficult economic scenario—PiS would remain a credible option with policies designed to shield households from rising prices. Notably, pension indexation is projected to approach 15 percent, with inflation expected to stay below that level on average. This reinforces PiS’s potential to claim a third term, countering narratives that winning is impossible, as demonstrated in past European elections.
Still, the opposition appears to have learned from earlier setbacks. Present indications suggest the opposition may avoid a single unified list, instead forming blocs such as a Poland 2050–PSL combination or coalitions involving Links and KO, or the left forming its own bloc. If so, a multi‑bloc opposition could create new dynamics, though polls show that total support for all opposition factions could still erode PiS’s lead.
Historical references, like a March 2019 Kantar poll, show how unification narratives shaped expectations, producing two blocs: a European coalition and a left bloc, with outcomes that later proved different from those expectations. The current landscape remains fluid and contested. Each potential alliance carries its own drawbacks, particularly regarding how rival coalitions would handle alliances like Poland 2050 with PSL or the left with KO. Historically, the supposed bonus for unification in list-building has faded in practice, as seen in the European Parliament results.
How might PiS grow its support now? The focus appears to be on reclaiming voters who backed PiS in 2019. Some observers, including Rafał Chwedoruk, contend that PiS has limited capacity to attract new voters beyond its current base, based on present polling data.
There are studies that have not yet been widely published, suggesting a post‑conflict “flag effect” among indecisive voters and passive supporters, including those who voted for Duda, who expressed greater backing for PiS amid national challenges. Voters recall past opposition positions, such as the claim of limited funds, and favor a government prepared to defend social programs during hard times. Instances of early stewardship under the previous administration, and subsequent differences in handling debt and inflation, contribute to voter memories that shape current attitudes.
Questions remain about whether those who view the opposition and the current government negatively will be drawn to new voters. Could this narrative attract fresh support beyond the existing PiS base?
There is a sizeable segment of undecided voters who supported PiS in 2019 and Duda in 2020. If they opt for PiS again, the party’s path to a third term appears plausible. Yet polarization remains intense. Even with substantial program proposals, many opposition voters may stay fixed in their positions, underscoring the need to re‑engage voters who previously supported PiS and are now in the “waiting room” of uncertainty. When circumstances improve and those voters weigh the prospect of unfavorable leadership, their motivation to vote could rise significantly.
In this context, evaluating the merit of presenting new social programs during the campaign comes into play. Various programs may mobilize former PiS supporters who still expect tangible solutions. The specifics of how such proposals would be implemented remain in the hands of campaign staff, and the details are not disclosed here.
Overall, the campaign strategy envisions new program proposals paired with reminders of the prior governing period to stimulate support. The goal is to rally current PiS voters to the polls and persuade the “waiting room” voters with fresh ideas and commentary about the opposition’s past performance.
In public commentary, PiS’s campaign approach has been described as an effort to cast the opposition in a negative light, using various communications tactics. If a contrasting narrative is chosen, it would frame Donald Tusk as a political casualty born of his own governance choices rather than a victim of a broader political process. Polls reflecting public trust rankings show fluctuating perceptions of Tusk, with recent data indicating a notable degree of mistrust tied to past actions, including the handling of funds and inflation.
From a polling perspective, what percentage would signify a mandate for PiS to govern alone again?
Analysts suggest counting the votes of 2019 parliamentary voters with the addition of some 2020 presidential supporters, while also considering the potential impact of policy proposals and the credibility of a governance platform that presents a strong Poland, close to its people, and a track record of effective program delivery.
However, the essential question remains whether achieving a higher than 40 percent share is more critical than understanding how the opposition might organize and vote. If the opposition moves with separate lists, PiS could see a lower percentage outcome; if blocs form, polarization intensifies and the calculations shift. The scenarios vary widely.
Adam Stankiewicz contributed to the discussion.
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