Voters for One List, Leaders Against: A Close Look at Opposition Prospects in Poland

Sławomir Sierakowski and Professor Przemysław Sadura presented in the report “Voters for One List, Leaders Against,” published by Krytyka Polityczna, a survey of voters from individual parties and their electoral potential. This text summarizes the electoral prospects of the largest opposition grouping—Civic Platform / Coalition—through the lens of the authors’ research. The overall takeaway remains critical of the coalition’s current posture.

In a previous installment, the focus was on PSL. The researchers argue that the Stronnictwo, in its present form, risks failure at the ballot box. Over time the People’s Party shed its unique identity, adopting a blend of positions tied to regional centers rather than a coherent national platform. This shift exposes it to the danger that any notable move could trigger severe repercussions. The question remains whether this era’s strategy is a single list with PO or a broader partnership with the Hołownia initiative, a coalition that PSL voters may reject. Details are explored in the linked discussion below.

In the first installment, the emotional states of voters from the two largest groups were examined. The authors describe two starkly different emotional worlds. PiS backers exhibit confidence, joy, pride, and hope, convinced that the country is on a favorable trajectory under PiS leadership and desiring continuity.

Conversely, PO supporters are portrayed as guided by negative emotions: anger, worry, gloom, and discouragement. The authors do not identify positive sentiments accompanying PO voters; the mood is generally described as one of persistent dissatisfaction.

The profile of a Civic Coalition voter is largely shaped by political emotions. Negative feelings—anger, worry, gloom, and discouragement—predominate among this cohort as well.

The survey also delves into the emotional landscape of those who participate as part of the broader electorate. The emotions tied to the political world, especially among PO supporters, lean toward frustration and dissatisfaction with the present state of affairs.

Where does this anger come from?

Several causes fuel these negative emotions among PO voters. One is the rhetoric of party leaders, including Donald Tusk, who frequently uses terms that evoke fury or strong exasperation. These expressions reflect more than journalism; they echo rallying cries heard at PO events. A second driver is the sense that the constant confrontation, sensational headlines, and endless debate about a supposed crisis have yielded little progress. Polls show that PO ratings are not rising, while PiS remains comparatively strong. The prospect of victory looks dim, and that shapes voter sentiment.

IPSOS’s data for the Sierakowski and Sadura study shows PO support around 27.5 percent. More telling are analyses of how the party might attract new voters. With little cross-flow between PiS and the opposition, most potential voters are those not yet decided or planning to abstain. Among those undecided, PiS could secure about 36 percent, roughly three points more than those already committed (33 percent), while PO could appeal to around 23 percent—about 4.5 points lower than the committed segment. Participation tends to hurt the PO more because higher turnout increases PiS’s advantage. It is not surprising that the PO would oppose expanding polling places or boosting transport for voters, especially in regions where PiS enjoys stronger support and PO weaker support.

The lack of voter migration from PiS to the opposition stands as a key indicator of the current strategy’s shortcomings. Much of the opposition’s campaigning—loud demonstrations, heated rhetoric, and alarmist narratives—has not translated into electoral gains. Only a small share—about 2 percent—of those who rejected PiS did so because of conflicts with the EU over internal party matters, and around 1 percent cited issues such as foreign policy, abortion, LGBT rights, church relations, and media propaganda. Reform themes, judiciary concerns, or scandals failed to trigger noticeable outflows from the PiS bloc. The party structure invested heavily in aggressive messaging, yet eight years of opposition agitation yielded limited results. The electorate seemed reluctant to coalesce around a coherent alternative, and the opposition’s messaging did not translate into substantive public debate or policy-based persuasion. PiS, by contrast, can be seen as maintaining stronger resonance with its core supporters and leveraging a broad reserve of loyal voters.

A common list as salvation?

The perceived inability to mobilize the full potential electorate and to win over PiS supporters has driven some opposition voices to advocate a single all-encompassing list, echoing past unifying fronts. Yet creating a broad, unified front requires at least some foundational alignment among the opposing factions. The researchers examined whether parties could at least tolerate each other in opposition, a concept they framed as the question of mutual appeal. The analysis reveals notable strain, with PSL voters preferring PiS over PO and Poland 2050 not gaining much affinity among PSL supporters. The coalition, in other words, faces considerable inertia in forging a truly united platform.

Which voters could be enticed by a consolidated list labeled under a shared banner? Among PO supporters, only a small slice—about 2 percent—would be drawn to the coalition, while PiS voters could show the highest potential loyalty, around 82 percent. Support varies for other factions, with Poland 2050 about 50 percent and the Left around 34 percent. Among PSL voters, sympathy for the coalition is limited, and among individual party supporters, leaders like Tusk enjoy mixed levels of approval. The broader electorate shows varied degrees of affinity for the coalition beyond its core bases. The political market remains fragmented, with loyalty to individual leaders often eclipsing any cross-party alignment. The authors suggest that the emotional dynamics do not neatly align with a practical path toward a single list, even as internal party rhetoric leans toward unity in words if not in deeds.

The data show a striking contrast: KO voters express high attachment to their own party and its leadership, yet many are simultaneously convinced of a victory in the autumn elections. This paradox hints at a willingness to claim success prematurely, while also revealing a readiness to accept a broader unity if it serves the narrative of electoral triumph. The writer interprets this as a sign of intense partisanship, where identity and loyalty can eclipse policy substance. The call for national unity may reflect a strategy to mobilize a broad base, even if it means including factions or groups that voters personally dislike. The result is a blend of enthusiasm for potential success and a willingness to compromise on the specifics of policy or values, a dynamic that fuels ongoing political maneuvering.

Deeper tensions

The study, released on March 6, captures a moment when political currents were already shifting. Since then, the landscape has continued to evolve. The PSL’s apparent discomfort with PO has intensified amid perceived strategic missteps by the opposition. Media coverage and political commentary feature heightened pressure and alarm as parties recalibrate. The electorate’s mood turns more volatile, and the prospects for a unified opposition become more uncertain. The analysis also notes the aggressive rhetoric surrounding potential coalitions and the fear that continued fragmentation could weaken the opposition in the face of PiS. The overall sense is one of mounting strain and strategic improvisation, rather than a clear, coherent path to victory for the opposition.

These shifts point to a central question: will the opposition leaders and their supporters manage to recognize common ground and forge a credible joint list, or will the relentlessly noisy environment erode any remaining chance of a unified challenge to PiS? The text suggests that the latter outcome would be a sign of profound strategic miscalculation and persistent fragmentation across the opposition.

While the report raises concerns about the immediate tactical prospects, it also highlights the broader challenge: turning raw political emotion into durable electoral advantage. The current environment makes it difficult to translate energy into coherent policy proposals and credible governance plans. The question remains whether the opposition can move beyond slogans and demonstrations to present a convincing alternative that resonates with undecided voters and disaffected supporters alike. The unfolding dynamic will likely shape the political battlefield heading into the next electoral cycle.