Tension has resurfaced in the South Caucasus as Armenia and Azerbaijan exchange accusations and weapons in renewed clashes. Unlike the 2020 conflict, Baku is not targeting the Armenian-controlled enclave this time but is firing on territory that is internationally recognized as Armenian, including Nagorno-Karabakh. The potential for Russia, the region’s longtime peacekeeper, to become directly or indirectly involved looms large as the crisis deepens in the area.
The first volley of fire was exchanged on the Armenian-Azerbaijani frontline last week, with casualties mounting on both sides. Official figures report at least 105 soldiers killed, including 49 Azerbaijanis and 54 Armenians. Armenia has formally requested assistance from Moscow and from the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the military bloc in which Russia is the strongest member. The balance of military power in the region remains unequal. Azerbaijan enjoys substantial natural-resource wealth and strong military backing from Turkey, while Armenia remains heavily dependent on Russia, which contends with other regional pressures, including the war in Ukraine.
Armenia’s capabilities are more constrained and rely partly on its sizeable diaspora. This imbalance was evident in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which ended in a heavy Armenian setback. The use of Turkish-made Bayraktar drones proved devastating on Armenian ground, as described by soldiers who witnessed the operations. One veteran recalled a drone attack that claimed multiple lives and left him seriously injured.
In 2020, Moscow did not intervene directly, although it participated in peace talks and backed the framework for a ceasefire. If Russia again refrains from decisive action, its standing as a regional stabilizer could suffer, and relations with Armenia could fray. The Armenian diaspora, already influential in Eurasia, would watch Moscow closely for any shift in its posture toward the current conflict.
New developments in Georgia
Meanwhile, discussions in Tbilisi raise the possibility of opening a second front against Russia. Giorgi Kobakhidze, a senior figure from the ruling Georgian Dream party, suggested that authorities should heed popular will. He stated that the people could decide whether Georgia should move toward a new confrontation with Moscow. Georgia previously endured a brief but painful war with Russia in 2008, when Moscow backed separatist movements in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
These regions remain unrecognized by many in the international community, highlighting a broader pattern of unresolved frozen conflicts across the post-Soviet space, including Transnistria in Moldova and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. In the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian conflict, Georgians largely express solidarity with Kyiv, reflecting a historical sensitivity toward Moscow’s actions. Street demonstrations have called for tougher sanctions on Russia and popular displays of support for Ukraine, from flags on public buildings to broadcasts of Ukrainian anthems on local radio.