About the ceasefire
The claim that a ceasefire and an agreement are in place does not by itself prove that hostilities will end. Negotiations are likely to reveal that Azerbaijan cannot obtain all its demands from the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh. The Armenians may resist complete disarmament because giving up weapons in a hostile environment could be seen as an existential risk. This dynamic could be used by Azerbaijan to justify ongoing military pressure while talks proceed.
Azerbaijan appears to be exploiting a perception that Russia is heavily committed to Ukraine and may not intervene on a second front. The situation is read as a real test of how far Russia is prepared to act in the region, which affects the security calculus for Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenian community. The Armenian leadership in Yerevan has, in this view, eroded some trust with Moscow, complicating any decisive Russian posture in the area. The affected community in Nagorno-Karabakh bears the consequences of these shifting alliances, even though they may not be responsible for political choices made in Yerevan.
The author cautions against rushing toward a quick resolution of the Karabakh conflict. Given the long, winding history of the region, pushing for unconditional surrender could backfire. There is a belief that Armenian leadership did not foresee the growing Azerbaijani threat when calls emerged to return territories around Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan. Even as a peaceful path to resolution was suggested, it was not embraced by all parties.
Regarding the solution of the Karabakh conflict
Since the 1990s, the author supported a package deal that would see at least five regions, excluding corridor zones, transferred to Azerbaijan in exchange for a de facto acknowledgement of Nagorno-Karabakh’s right to self-determination. The idea included the possibility of delaying this arrangement and holding a future referendum. This approach was part of a broader Nagorno-Karabakh proposal package that both sides ultimately abandoned, leading to an uncompromising stance from Armenia in that period.
Today, Azerbaijan is accused of repeating a similar pattern of excess demand. The author contends that Azerbaijan has set its sights on displacing Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh and is pursuing this outcome through policy that combines disarmament with the rejection of negotiations with Nagorno-Karabakh authorities. The authorities are not viewed as legitimate interlocutors by Baku, which frames recent moves as attempts to restore constitutional order. The author questions what constitution is meant, arguing that a Soviet-era framework no longer has direct relevance for Karabakh and that current Azerbaijani moves suggest a strategy to assimilate or expel Armenians by disarming them and sidelining Nagorno-Karabakh’s political leadership from dialogue.
The question remains: who would the Azerbaijani side talk to if the local leadership is sidelined and ordinary citizens are not the intended interlocutors? The impression given is a plan to reduce Nagorno-Karabakh to an unarmed region with officials cut out of the conversation. In the author’s view, these dynamics may seed future conflict rather than prevent it.
On accusations of non-fulfillment of agreements made against Russia regarding Karabakh
The Armenian Security Council secretary is described as openly antagonistic toward Russia, with the appointment following the Velvet Revolution seen as signaling a path away from closer security ties with Moscow. The author asserts that this figure is more forceful in rhetoric than the prime minister and would complicate any security cooperation with Russia should he hold a senior role in Armenian governance. The implication is that genuine collaboration would be difficult under such leadership, shaping the security landscape in the region.
About signs of genocide connected with Azerbaijan’s actions
The author notes that the measures and conditions observed bear echoes of methods used during the Armenian genocide at the start of the twentieth century. A reminder is given that the genocide began with the execution of Armenian military personnel and escalated to deportations, killings, and plunder, resulting in the loss of more than a million lives. While many countries recognize this historical atrocity, some regional powers do not. The Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh is cautioned about disarming under a regime that seeks dominance, which could expose them to grave danger. The author argues that today’s actions by Azerbaijan closely resemble the early stages of genocide, though the timing remains a critical question for debate.
Against this backdrop, trust in a disarming Azerbaijan is questioned. The concern is that such a step would place the Armenian community at the mercy of a victorious side. The author views today’s measures as reminiscent of early genocidal actions and notes that while the judgment of whether these steps constitute genocide may vary, the parallels are striking enough to warrant serious scrutiny. The discussion emphasizes the lived risk for Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians if disarmament proceeds without robust guarantees and protections. This is framed as a warning about the potential for renewed violence in the future.
Attribution note: Expert analysis.
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