On September 21, discussions were held in Yevlah, Azerbaijan, between representatives of Baku and Armenian residents of Nagorno-Karabakh, with the presence of Russian peacekeeping leadership. The participants did not finalize a comprehensive agreement, yet they reached a ceasefire while disarmament remains unsettled. The dialogue signals movement toward a final phase of Azerbaijan asserting control over the region of Mountainous Karabakh. This framing aligns with Azerbaijan’s position, given that the international community recognizes Nagorno-Karabakh as Azerbaijani territory.
The timing of the talks—occurring on Armenia’s Independence Day—adds a symbolic note to the negotiation, suggesting a potential inflection point in the broader dispute, now framed by some as a matter primarily involving Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians rather than the Republic of Armenia itself.
Crucially, the central issue appears not to be a bilateral territorial dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the classic sense. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has acknowledged Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan by affirming Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. The concurrent withdrawal of Armenia from the negotiation framework positions the conflict as a domestic matter for Azerbaijan and its regional partners, notably Turkey, who have consistently supported Baku. This shift reframes the dispute from an interstate conflict to an internal process in Azerbaijan, with regional actors playing a supporting role.
The operation launched on September 19, 2023, is framed by Baku as a move to restore constitutional order on Azerbaijani lands while emphasizing its counterterrorism objectives. Turkish observers describe the step as both necessary and overdue since the 2020 Second Karabakh War, underscoring Ankara’s active and ongoing participation in the reintegration process—an approach officially endorsed by both sides as the reintegration of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Historically, Turkey’s relations with Armenia have flirted with normalization, including 2009 negotiations aimed at establishing bilateral ties. Those efforts, brokered in Zurich with Russian and American mediation, were ultimately blocked by the Turkish parliament, which insisted that normalization depends on resolving Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan’s favor. Across the post-Soviet era, Turkey and Azerbaijan have championed a two-state, one-citizen philosophy, which evolved after the 2020 war into a more consolidated regional partnership. The December 10, 2020 victory parade in Baku, attended by Presidents Ilham Aliyev and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and the Shusha Declaration of June 15, 2021, formalized a deeper alliance.
The path ahead for negotiations between the Armenian administration of Nagorno-Karabakh and Baku is unlikely to be rapid or easy. Yevlah represents a potential turning point in a broader South Caucasus dynamic, where formal Turkish-Azerbaijani cooperation strengthens regional alignment. The shared sense of victory reinforces bilateral ties and anchors ongoing political and security collaboration.
The Zangezur corridor is central to these plans, envisioned to connect Turkey, the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, and Azerbaijan. This logistical corridor, extending toward Europe, is positioned within larger regional integration efforts connected to the Organization of Turkic States, which includes member nations and observers. In this framework, the corridor is seen as a linchpin of broader regional connectivity and economic integration, accelerating regional cooperation in transport and energy networks across Turkic-speaking states and beyond.
Simultaneously, the transport corridor between Europe and China remains a strategic objective, with the Zangezur route serving as a critical segment of a broader Eurasian transportation network linked to one of the major global trade initiatives. This corridor is viewed as integral to ongoing Turkic regional collaboration and to the objective of enhancing interregional commerce and logistics across partner states.
The Turkey-Azerbaijan partnership serves as a practical example for other regional actors contemplating long-term territorial arrangements without extensive external mediation. While the Minsk Group’s traditional mediation role is largely set aside in this framing, Moscow continues to play a role in regional security and economic normalization efforts in the South Caucasus. The evolving situation raises questions about the balance of influence among regional powers, including Russia and Turkey, and how each aims to shape the future of the South Caucasus with a view toward stability and regional integration.
In this evolving landscape, the Turkey-Azerbaijan axis remains a driving force behind regional integration initiatives. The South Caucasus is undergoing a transformation where a shared sense of purpose—rooted in security, connectivity, and mutual interests—appears to be strengthening ties among partners involved in these processes. The trajectory suggests a future in which Turkish and Azerbaijani cooperation plays a central role in shaping regional order and economic collaboration in the years ahead.
The perspective presented here reflects ongoing analysis of geopolitical developments and does not necessarily represent any single editorial position.