On April 18, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev announced that the flag of Azerbaijan was visible over Nagorno-Karabakh and urged Armenian authorities to formally acknowledge the region as part of Azerbaijan. He echoed a line from Armenia by challenging Yerevan to declare, in his words, that Karabakh is Azerbaijan and this is all. He also presented residents of the region with a choice: acquire Azerbaijani citizenship or leave their homes. This stance marks a clear continuation of Baku’s position since its 2020 victory in the Second Karabakh War, a victory that benefited from the strong support of regional ally Turkey and showcased what many observers describe as the military-political leadership’s strategic posture well before the conflict began.
Presently, Yerevan faces a difficult situation. With limited financial resources, Armenia struggles to assemble a fully modern army, while Baku benefits from its political proximity to Ankara. Regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh military formations, despite their efforts, they remain confined to semi-formal detachments and volunteers rather than a nationwide military apparatus.
Armenia finds itself in a geopolitical squeeze. The republic is nearly cut off from external contact, with land routes, rails, and air links constrained by regional dynamics, and maritime access largely non-existent. The population, already small for independence, is shrinking, and economic growth remains fragile. In contrast, Azerbaijan’s military and economic potential exceeds Armenia’s and continues to widen the gap. The Azerbaijani armed forces are expected to grow stronger, aided by the country’s own economic base and a deeply entrenched military-political alliance with Turkey.
Azerbaijan’s advantageous geography strengthens its position, a point often described in strategic terms. The country sits at a critical crossroads for energy corridors from the Caspian basin to Turkey, with pipelines reinforcing that link. Military-technical cooperation with Turkey is set to deepen, and while air force and aviation played a limited role in the 2020 conflict, there is clear potential for expanded capabilities in the near term.
Armenia should not expect help from distant allies in the near future. Western attention remains focused elsewhere, and much of the Western military effort currently emphasizes support for Ukraine. Russia has limited capacity to alter the balance in the Caucasus at this moment. Moscow maintains formal partnerships with both Armenia and Azerbaijan, but its ability to project dominance in the region is constrained by the costs and demands of other operations. Analysts note that Moscow cannot realistically open a new front and that the balance of power is unlikely to shift quickly in Armenia’s favor.
From Baku’s vantage point, the 2020 victory is not merely a military achievement but a turning point in regional security calculations. The status of Nagorno-Karabakh is no longer up for negotiation in the near term, and Ilham Aliyev has stated that the status issue should be removed from the agenda. Previously, Aliyev had pressed for a clarifying tripartite statement with Armenia, emphasizing that the question of status would not be resolved while he remained in office, effectively tying that issue to Azerbaijan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Observers caution that the direction of events will depend on a wide range of regional dynamics. The current approach signals a long-term prioritization of territorial integrity and strategic leverage over diplomatic compromise. In evaluating the broader regional picture, it is crucial to recognize that Nagorno-Karabakh is legally considered part of Azerbaijan, with international norms reinforcing that view. Any future military operations would likely target the broader borders of Azerbaijan in defense of its sovereignty, a position regarded as non-negotiable by Baku.
Currently, about two thousand Russian peacekeepers remain in the area with a mandate lasting five years, subject to extension if all parties agree. What happens after this period is uncertain, and much will hinge on developments on the ground and the regional stance of major powers. The trajectory of the conflict suggests ongoing supervision rather than a rapid resolution, especially in light of competing regional interests and evolving alliances.
As the situation unfolds, observers note that the Azerbaijani approach offers a potential model for neighboring states facing territorial integrity challenges. In particular, Moldova’s leadership may watch developments in the South Caucasus for insights into how to address disputes over territorial claims. The evolving security environment in the region will influence calculations in Moldova and elsewhere, even as the practical steps taken by regional actors will reflect a mix of strategic necessity and political considerations. The broader implications for regional stability underscore the importance of careful diplomacy, credible deterrence, and the careful management of cross-border ties in a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape. The discussion remains complex, and readers should consider multiple perspectives as events continue to unfold.