The reporting around Iran and Hezbollah in relation to Hamas and the October 7 attacks on Israel has been contested and multifaceted. Iranian leaders described the operation as a “radically autonomous” undertaking, with Ayatollah Ali Khamenei labeling it as 100 percent Palestinian and asserting that Hamas kept the plan secret. Reuters and other U.S. intelligence assessments suggested that Iran and its Lebanese ally were caught unprepared by the magnitude of the assault, underscoring a disconnect between stated positions and on-the-ground actions.
In interviews conducted for this publication, a prominent defense scholar from Canada’s Royal Military College commented that Iran’s lack of specific knowledge about the Al Aqsa Flood operation does not imply a disengagement. Rather, it is seen as part of a broader strategy in which Tehran allows its proxies freedom of action. This approach provides plausible deniability while enabling the movement of funds, weapons, and logistics to Palestinian militias for decades, according to the analyst.
There is no simple line of authority from Tehran to groups like Hamas. Hamas itself is described as more than a single armed faction. It is a political party and social movement rooted in philanthropy and public services for a poorer population. Its ideology blends Palestinian nationalism with Islamic identity, and although Sunni in orientation, it operates within a regional context dominated by various political and sectarian currents, including Iran where Shiism is more prevalent.
Iran has not relied solely on internal resources. Financial support has also flowed from Gulf states, notably Qatar, as well as other actors in the region. Reports indicate a willingness by Israeli and international observers to acknowledge these financial channels, including efforts to move funds through private networks after certain Palestinian factions faced funding pressures. High-level statements from European and U.S. officials have highlighted these flows and their implications for the broader conflict.
Historical investigations into Hamas’s finances show a complex web of assets and enterprises, from investments controlled by a private fund to business interests in energy, real estate, and infrastructure across several countries. In some cases, pieces of this network were identified through seized documents and subsequent sanctions by the United States and the European Union. The aim has been to disrupt the financial structures that support Hamas’s operations while monitoring the broader regional implications of such sanctions.
Analysts have noted that Hamas has experimented with various transfer mechanisms, including digital currencies, to move resources for its activities. This underscores a wider concern about how non-state actors finance long-running conflicts through evolving financial technologies and informal networks. Treasury and security officials have discussed these challenges in public statements and policy briefings.
Sources of arms and equipment
State sources from Iran have claimed that weapons destined for Hamas are coordinated through a broader geographic corridor, with the Strip’s borders tightly controlled by neighboring states. Observers point to a campaign by some Western actors to challenge Iranian influence and question Tehran’s role in supporting militant groups.
Counterterrorism researchers, including those affiliated with U.S. military institutions, emphasize that Iran contributed material support that influenced the October attacks. A comprehensive analysis highlighted a range of weapons, including unmanned aerial systems, rockets, explosives, and assorted ammunition, as materials that were smuggled into Gaza and subsequently used in the conflict. The study also explored the networks through which such equipment could travel from Iran to allied groups in the region.
In interviews, experts have discussed ongoing training and coordination with Hamas militants, noting that Iran’s support often involves collaboration with allied groups in Syria and Lebanon. Claims about advanced weaponry and the extent of external training have been met with debate, reflecting the complexity of assessing clandestine military assistance.
Fluctuations in the relationship
The relationship between Tehran and Hamas has experienced cycles of support and friction, notably heightened during the Syrian civil conflict. Iran’s backing for various armed factions, and the shifting flows of funds and materiel, have at times been adjusted in response to changing regional alignments and pressures. These dynamics illustrate Tehran’s interest in maintaining influence while navigating competitive regional interests.
Analysts suggest that Iran’s balancing act aims to preserve influence in a region marked by volatility. The evolving geopolitical environment, including efforts to advance Arab-Israeli rapprochement, could reshape Tehran’s posture. At the same time, episodes of violence have raised questions about the resilience of security frameworks and the potential for broader spillovers across the region.
The long-term risks for Tehran center on how continued involvement with Palestinian militants might affect its standing. A broader escalation could complicate regional ties and complicate Tehran’s already challenging position amid sanctions and domestic political pressures. Nonetheless, observers note that Iran remains intent on sustaining leverage in a volatile landscape, even as it weighs the costs and benefits of continued support to allied groups.