Iran’s nuclear ambitions amid Israeli and Western responses

ready for war

On July 26, Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz stated that Israel is prepared to strike Iran to halt its nuclear ambitions, emphasizing that the issue is not a regional concern alone but a matter for the world. He asserted that Israel could act to contain the atom and that the problem extends beyond any single nation. [Source: Israel Defense Ministry transcripts]

The tone from Jerusalem has not been isolated. A little more than a week earlier, Aviv Kochavi, the Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces, indicated that the Israeli military is ready for a potential contingency with Iran. He described the preparation of a strategic scenario against Iran’s nuclear program as a moral duty and a matter of national security. [Source: Israeli military briefing]

Prime Minister Yair Lapid has suggested that diplomacy alone cannot stop Iran, arguing that the free world must be prepared to use force if Tehran continues its nuclear program. This view was voiced during a joint press conference with US President Joe Biden. [Source: official remarks]

Biden echoed similar sentiments, giving an interview to Israeli Channel 12 on July 13. Asked whether Tehran would consider force if it did not halt its nuclear efforts, the American leader responded affirmatively, describing it as a last resort. [Source: Channel 12 interview]

Shortly after Biden spoke, Kamal Harrazi, head of Iran’s strategic foreign affairs council, claimed Tehran possesses the technical capacity to produce an atomic bomb but stopped short of a definitive decision by Iran’s leadership. CIA director William Burns later indicated that Iran is not pursuing nuclear weapons at present, though its uranium enrichment capabilities have grown. [Source: remarks from Iranian official and CIA briefing]

Against this backdrop, cyber operations targeting Iran’s nuclear and industrial facilities have continued. At the end of June, Iran suffered a major cyberattack that disrupted operations at a steel mill, with the hacker group Predatory Sparrow, reportedly linked to Tel Aviv, claiming responsibility. [Source: cybersecurity briefing]

Simultaneously, reports emerged of heightened Israeli efforts in sabotage and intelligence work. In early June, General Ali Nasiri, head of Iran’s IRGC information security service since 2017, was detained on suspicions of spying for Israel along with other senior Iranian officials. [Source: Iranian security leak]

Iranian authorities also faced the assassination of leading nuclear program experts. Said Tamardar Absolute, a senior rocket engineer with the Revolutionary Guards, was found dead, following suspicions that Israeli intelligence might have been involved in earlier killings of Ayub Entezari and Kamran Agamolai. Many Middle East observers suggest the shadow war could intensify if a nuclear deal remains unresolved. [Source: regional briefings]

Vladimir Sazhin, a senior researcher at the Institute for Oriental Studies, cautioned that a large-scale war between Israel and Iran is unlikely. He noted that Israel could strike nuclear facilities directly or with American support, but emphasized that no full ground invasion would occur due to geography and the resilience of Iran’s forces. He also pointed out that Iran fields a substantial defense and resistant forces. [Source: expert testimony]

Sergey Demidenko, an associate professor at the RANEPA Institute of Social Sciences, argued that a sustained ground war is improbable because the two countries do not share a border, and aerial operations would face significant hurdles. He suggested that targeted strikes or sabotage against specific facilities remain plausible but are unlikely to solve the broader challenge posed by Iran’s nuclear program. [Source: academic analysis]

Some experts believe that selective attacks against Iranian nuclear infrastructure could occur, though many facilities are large and heavily protected by air defenses. The general consensus among analysts is that a few attacks would not suffice to halt enrichment efforts entirely. [Source: security analysts]

Demidenko also mentioned that Israeli sorties into Syria could target high-ranking IRGC officers, but this would not amount to a broader campaign. [Source: academic commentary]

stop the inevitable

Diplomatic efforts to renew the nuclear agreement began in mid-2021 in Vienna but stalled in March 2022 when the United States kept the IRGC on its terrorist list. Israel supported the decision, while Iran viewed the move as a critical obstacle because the IRGC wields extensive influence at home. [Source: diplomatic timeline]

Chronicle of Decay

In 2018, former US President Donald Trump announced Washington’s withdrawal from the JCPOA, the 2015 agreement aimed at constraining Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. Iran was to allow IAEA inspections, while Western states would lift sanctions progressively. [Source: JCPOA history]

In July 2019, Iran announced it would resume enriching uranium beyond JCPOA limits. [Source: nuclear developments]

European diplomacy later advanced. Josep Borrell, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, visited Iran in June to meet with Foreign Minister Hussein Amir-Abdollahian and helped steer negotiations toward de-escalation. He later published observations calling for a renewed JCPOA and outlined a draft text for lifting sanctions and restoring the agreement. [Source: EU diplomacy notes]

Borrell suggested that the proposed text represents the best possible framework given the compromises involved and urged decisive action, while criticizing Washington for a polarized stance ahead of elections. Iran’s chief negotiator Ali Bagheri Kani indicated that Tehran was reviewing the draft and would propose its own structural and substantive updates. [Source: European diplomacy briefing]

Analysts such as Demidenko argued that negotiations could stretch indefinitely if results remain elusive. He noted that Iran has not demonstrated a clear intent to build a bomb and suggested that Tehran seeks to advance its nuclear capabilities for strategic influence rather than outright weaponization. Sazhin observed that Tehran aims for mastery of nuclear science that could enable weaponization within months if necessary, a capability that shapes Iranian policy even without a declared nuclear arsenal. [Source: expert analyses]