Alarm bells have been ringing loudly from European chancelleries to remote corners of the former Soviet space. Across the Azerbaijan–Armenia border, at least 150 people have died in recent clashes, a conflict framed by two adversaries in the Caucasus and backed, respectively, by Turkey and Russia. A little farther east, renewed border clashes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have claimed lives, underscoring a fragile security landscape in Central Asia. These states, together with Russia, China, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, form part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which gathered for discussions this week. Yet alongside formal diplomacy there is a swirl of information and misinformation about ongoing confrontations in the region, including fears of a broader war and the possibility that Georgia might open a second front against Russia in its contested South Ossetia zone.
The prevailing concern is that the Ukraine conflict has stirred up many of the unresolved, or frozen, disputes that emerged after the Soviet collapse. Russia, a regional power, is preoccupied with Ukraine and appears unable to project force on multiple fronts. In response, France convened a United Nations Security Council meeting to address the escalation along the Armenia–Azerbaijan frontier.
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Analyst Mira Milosevic, who studies Russia, Eurasia, and the Balkans at the Royal Institute of Elcano, notes that there is not a simple domino effect at play. She observes a strong will in Western and Ukrainian media and among some political analysts to push Vladimir Putin toward a decisive end to what they describe as imperial ambitions.
Transnistria and Moldova
Milosevic emphasizes that if the Ukraine war prevents Russia from deploying force everywhere at once, the most likely flashpoints could be Transnistria and Moldova. Moldova, a republic of roughly 2.6 million people that borders Ukraine to the north and east, includes the Transnistria region along the northern border. Transnistria declares itself independent with its capital in Tiraspol, while remaining heavily dependent on Russian economic and military support, including a stationed force described as a peacekeeping unit consisting of about 1,500 Russian soldiers and substantial military equipment. The region presents a scenario where a small, heavily influenced area could become a flashpoint even as broader conflicts unfold elsewhere. Milosevic notes that past episodes show Russia acting as the main security arbiter in this space, a position that complicates regional diplomacy.
Early weeks of the Ukraine crisis saw incidents in Transnistria, but tensions have cooled in the immediate term.
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan
A Wednesday clash on the Kyrgyzstan–Tajikistan border left two Tajik border guards dead and 16 wounded, highlighting a long-standing dispute over roughly half of a thousand-kilometer frontier. Moscow urged Bishkek and Dushanbe to pursue political dialogue to prevent further provocations. This flare-up arrived as Russian and Chinese leaders met in Samarkand for a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, seen by Moscow and Beijing as a strategic counterweight to Western influence. Iran is moving toward SCO participation, reinforcing an anti-NATO axis that includes Russia, China, and several Central Asian states.
Milosevic describes the Central Asian landscape as shaped by historical boundaries and Soviet-era legacies. She argues that Russia remains the sole security guarantor in the region with limited capacity to mediate across all disputes at once, which places heavy responsibility on Moscow during volatile periods. This dynamic creates a delicate balance for all involved parties as regional alignments shift.
Armenia and Azerbaijan
Armenia declared a ceasefire with Azerbaijan after two days of violent exchanges along their shared border, with casualties on both sides totaling around 150. The two nations continue talks over Nagorno-Karabakh, a region whose status has long fueled conflict and international concern. The 2020 clashes, in which Azerbaijan leveraged drone warfare and Turkish support, resulted in thousands of fatalities and a shifted regional balance. In the current cycle, observers note that Moscow remains a key security partner for Armenia, while Azerbaijan relies on Turkish military support.
Aframes or hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan are not confined to Nagorno-Karabakh proper. Moscow is reportedly weighing its options and may be prompted to intervene as a stabilizing force, with Armenia seeking assistance from Moscow and from the Collective Security Treaty Organization. The persistence of this dispute underscores the enduring fragility of regional peace and the challenge of reconciling long-standing grievances with broader strategic interests.
Analysts point out that regardless of how orderly the breakup of the USSR was described in the 1990s, the legacy of that era continues to generate protracted, often painful, confrontations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Federal and regional actors remain deeply involved, making durable solutions elusive.
Georgia and South Ossetia
The region has seen a surge in disinformation and propaganda as tensions rise. Reports and posts circulated about Georgian troop movements toward the North Ossetian border, but credible military activity has not been corroborated. In response to a Ukrainian lawmaker’s call for a definitive attack on South Ossetia and a possible second front against Russia, Georgian leaders publicly discussed their stance and national sentiment. The Kremlin-friendly press quickly spun the exchanges into dramatic headlines, fueling confusion about Georgia’s real military intentions.
Across these developments, observers stress the importance of careful verification and restrained rhetoric. The volatile mix of historical grievances, strategic calculations, and external influence continues to shape a regional security environment that remains tightly watched by international actors.