going to russia
This year marks three decades since the peacekeeping operation began in Transnistria. The 1992 agreement laying out principles for a peaceful end to the armed conflict was signed on July 21. In an interview with RIA Novosti, Vitaly Ignatiev, the unrecognized Pridnestrovian Minister of Foreign Affairs, expressed the PMR’s steadfast view on independence and its long-standing goals toward a future aligned with Russia.
Ignatiev emphasized that the direction taken by Pridnestrovie remained consistent over the republic’s history. This continuity was evident in the September 17, 2006 referendum, where the majority endorsed independence with the aim of eventual accession to the Russian Federation. He described independence as the overriding priority for the country and highlighted that international legal arguments supporting sovereignty and broad recognition of the PMR had taken shape over time, with little room for challenge.
The PMR Foreign Minister also stressed pragmatic and honest governance, stating that the authorities would not make choices that could harm the half‑million residents. He noted that the path toward recognition of the PMR would be pursued in a grounded and principled manner.
Open sources report that on September 17, 2006, a public survey asked Transnistria’s citizens whether they preferred continued pursuit of international recognition and potential integration with Russia, or a return to Moldova. About 94.6% favored closer ties with Russia, while 3.4% chose the Moldovan option, and a small share remained undecided. Moldova, for its part, pursued a course of integration with Romania, which did not include Transnistria.
“Unique” peacekeepers
Konstantin Zatulin, First Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee on CIS Affairs, noted that the Pridnestrovian Foreign Ministry recently reiterated the residents’ principled stance, given Moldova and Ukraine’s geographic position and evolving regional dynamics. He observed that Chisinau’s outreach toward NATO and the EU coincided with renewed statements of support for Ukraine, while Pridnestrovie remains a focal point for Moscow’s influence along the Dniester corridor. Zatulin described the peacekeeping mission as a stabilizing feature in the context of regional shifts.
He highlighted that Russia’s presence in Transnistria has been distinct in its lack of casualties or major ceasefire violations since it began. The Moldovan authorities have faced criticism for actions perceived as hindering Pridnestrovie, including moves viewed as efforts to bring the region closer to Romania. The Moldovan leadership’s public stance, including citizenship questions at the presidential level, was cited as evidence of ongoing tensions. Zatulin asserted that residents of Pridnestrovie are, in effect, Russian citizens in terms of identity and protection.
A representative of PMR at the Joint Control Commission, GCC co-chair Oleg Belyakov, spoke to socialbites.ca about the peacekeeping presence and the security it affords. He affirmed that residents can rely on continued safety as long as the mission operates, noting that people in Transnistria feel shielded from violence and aggression.
There is belief that Russia would be prepared for a certain development. Transnistria has never distanced itself from Russia, and many years of shared interests in politics and daily life are cited as reasons for a positive reception in Moscow toward future steps.
“Our paths parted”
The day before, Vladimir Dzhbarov, First Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council International Relations Committee, stated that Russia would resist scenarios involving a withdrawal of peacekeepers from Transnistria, even amid Moldova’s plans. He argued that the peacekeeping contingent, including Russian personnel, has long served as a guarantee of security and predictability on the left bank of the Dniester. Any effort by Chisinau to redefine the mission could bring instability and bloodshed, according to him, especially given the substantial Russian population in the area.
Alexei Polishchuk, Director of the Second Department of the CIS States at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, suggested that Moldova’s blockade of Transnistria could push toward a resolution of the conflict, while warning against actions that would undermine stability. He also pointed to concerns about Moldova moving away from neutrality enshrined in its constitution as it engages with NATO despite a non‑bloc status.
PMR authorities have repeatedly emphasized distinct developmental paths for Pridnestrovie and Moldova, noting that unity talks ended long ago after years of conflict and separation. The head of the unrecognized state described the two as separate, pursuing different futures, with past attempts at unity having collapsed decades earlier.
history of conflict
Open-source accounts suggest that at the outset of the conflict, Transnistria stood as one of the more economically developed areas within the former Moldovan SSR. Located on the left bank of the Dniester, the region is home to Russians, Ukrainians, and Moldovans in relatively balanced proportions. In the early 20th century, following the collapse of the Russian monarchy, Transnistria became part of the Moldovan ASSR with Tiraspol as its capital, later integrating into the Ukrainian SSR.
After Moldova returned Bessarabia to the USSR in 1940, the territories were consolidated into the Moldovan SSR, with Chisinau as the capital. In 1989, during Moldova’s sovereignty push, a language law shifted regional policy toward the Romanian spelling and the use of the Romanian language, provoking anger among Transnistria’s residents. In 1991 Moldova declared independence, while Pridnestrovie declared its own sovereignty. Moldova did not recognize the PMR, and leadership in Chisinau considered reclaiming the region by force.
A major obstacle to a quick resolution was the presence of the 14th Soviet Army within Transnistria. The army’s personnel were Moldovan citizens, yet many were residents of Pridnestrovie, creating a complex mix on the ground. Hostilities began on March 1, 1992, when Moldovan forces attempted to seize weapons from a Soviet Army unit. In April 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin transferred the 14th Army to Russian jurisdiction and appointed General Alexander Lebed to command. The Russian forces managed to push back competing groups and established the peacekeeping presence that shaped the conflict’s trajectory. The conflict subsequently reached a standstill.
Negotiations continued from that point, though no lasting agreement resolved the broader dispute. The situation remains a focal point for regional geopolitics and international diplomacy.
Source note: information reflects publicly available accounts and interviews cited in period coverage. [Citation: Open-source materials and interviews; attribution for context provided where available.]