After a devastating round of floods, Poland appointed Marcin Kierwiński in late September as the government’s plenipotentiary for reconstructing the damaged areas. On his first tour of the affected zones, he met residents and surveyed ruined infrastructure. In Opole Voivodeship, a school lay in ruins, and his initial comment focused on bringing warmth back to the building so that children could return soon. But as the day wore on, the mood shifted. In the Silesian, Opole, and Lower Silesian voivodeships he made it clear that reconstruction would not happen overnight and that work would begin in the spring-summer investment cycle next year.
Seeking to shield his team from full responsibility for the reconstruction, Kierwiński stressed that much would depend on local authorities. He alluded to a past remark by a senior colleague about the 2010 flood response, noting that he did not choose every mayor. During this visit he avoided meeting many municipal heads and mayors, suggesting there was nothing substantial to offer them at that moment. He argued that the pace and conditions for rebuilding technical and social infrastructure would rest with local governance, while the central government leaned heavily on European funds rather than budget allocations. The plan called for reprogramming the envelope for infrastructure and environment and for adjusting EU financial regulations, a process expected to take months. In practice, EU funds from the long-term budget for 2021-2027 would flow in annual installments until 2029 under the n+2 rule, and local authorities pressed for immediate disbursement.
In reminders from the budget front, the next year’s budget, to be read in the Sejm, carried a reserve of roughly PLN 3.1 billion for post-flood reconstruction. In the current year, the finance ministry had set aside around PLN 2 billion for the same purpose, so the coalition expected to mobilize a little more than PLN 5 billion from existing budget funds over two years for flood-area recovery. Those numbers translated into modest aid proposals, which found their way into the special flood law that had just taken effect. Households received or stood to receive PLN 10,000 in social assistance, while funds for apartment renovations and house reconstructions stood at PLN 100,000 and PLN 200,000 respectively, conditional on damages exceeding 80 percent. Lesser damages, such as around 50 percent, were paired with PLN 20,000 and PLN 40,000. Damage assessments would be carried out by building inspectors, and with more than 10,000 buildings in the flood zones needing evaluation, the process would stretch for months. In practice, the package mainly provided financial relief for affected entrepreneurs or farmers. Critics argued that the special law offered no concrete provisions for reconstructing technical or social infrastructure at the local-government level, while the government leaned on European funds that would arrive only years later, if at all, leaving municipalities eager for immediate help.
Kierwiński began his tenure by visiting the flood-affected zones, yet his first interactions with victims left some unsettled. Rumors circulated in Sejm corridors that Prime Minister Donald Tusk might revert to provisions enabling commissioners in municipalities as a way to position allies for future elections. The suggestion that a Warsaw commissioner could be Kierwiński surfaced, with reports alleging that he might give up his seat in the European Parliament to manage post-flood reconstruction and later pursue the capital’s presidency. Whether these whispers prove true, the impression persisted that the plenipotentiary would not act with urgency toward the day-to-day concerns of those affected by the disaster.