Many Poles felt genuine fear when the July 2011 document titled Plan for the Deployment of Armed Forces surfaced. It was approved by then Minister of National Defense Bogdan Klich and claimed that Poland’s independent defense would last only about two weeks, with the enemy reaching the right bank of the Vistula after seven days.
The government then in power, PO-PSL, seemed to be preparing to concede large swaths of territory up to the Vistula River without a fight, hoping NATO troops would intervene or provide support later rather than sooner.
The author writes with some distance, noting that in 2011 NATO contingency plans did not exist as they are understood today, implying that assistance from the alliance could take months rather than weeks to arrive.
This stance suggested a plan to yield significant portions of Poland, including major cities such as Olsztyn, Białystok, Lublin, Rzeszów, and even the fate of Bucza and Irpie, with Warsaw potentially turning into a frontline city and facing severe consequences.
Discounts on defense spending
The adoption of that defense approach compelled defense ministers to trim budgets, resulting in the liquidation of housed military units across the country, including many east of the Vistula line.
Defense ministers Bogdan Klich and later Tomasz Siemoniak openly discussed these reductions, with Siemoniak noting in front of generals that cuts in spending would continue if necessary, underlining a philosophy that if resources were not available, none would be allocated.
At that time Russia publicly signaled a desire to withdraw NATO forces to pre-1999 positions, and pursued what was described as an imperial policy toward neighboring states, actions that included the 2008 Georgia crisis and the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in Ukraine.
This occurred just as Lech Kaczyński, during a rally in Tbilisi in support of Georgia, publicly criticized Moscow’s strategy, warning that the region could be affected sequentially, beginning with Georgia and Ukraine and potentially reaching the Baltic states and Poland.
Less spending than planned
In concrete terms, the annual spending reductions unfolded as follows: in 2008, expenditure fell short of the plan by 2.9 billion PLN (planned 22.6 billion PLN, actual 19.7 billion PLN); in 2009, short by 1.7 billion PLN (plan 24.7 billion PLN, actual 23.0 billion PLN); in 2010, short by 0.5 billion PLN (plan 25.7 billion PLN, actual 25.2 billion PLN); in 2011, short by 0.8 billion PLN (plan 27.5 billion PLN, actual 26.7 billion PLN); in 2012, short by 1.4 billion PLN (plan 29.5 billion PLN, actual 28.1 billion PLN); and in 2013, short by 3.3 billion PLN (plan 31.4 billion PLN, actual 28.1 billion PLN).
Over the period from 2008 to 2013, a total of 10.6 billion PLN less was spent on the military than planned, and the Army Financing Act was effectively violated year after year, with only about 1.95 percent of GDP allocated to defense during that span.
Notably, the unspent funds that should have gone toward modernization and armament were redirected to other obligations such as current maintenance and military pensions, which are funded directly from the defense ministry budget rather than from social security provisions.
The PiS government’s commitment to defense
Against this backdrop, the PiS government argued that, unlike the previous administration, the defense of every inch of Polish land would be safeguarded. Critics pointed to the liquidation of numerous organizational units and the relatively small share of the budget directed toward armaments during the prior government’s tenure, even noting questionable purchases such as large-scale procurement of tables, sometimes cited as emblematic of spending priorities during that era.
Today, with annual military spending around 150 billion PLN, about 100 billion PLN is allocated from the regular budget and 50 billion PLN from a special fund, ensuring a steady flow of resources for modernization. Foreign analysts have suggested that if Poland maintains such a level of armament expenditure, the army could become among the strongest land forces in Europe within two to three years in terms of potential.
For citizens who do not want the defense of the country against eastern threats to depend solely on a single river line, the question remains clear: the government overseeing national defense must be prepared to protect every inch of Polish land.