Russia expands its missile capability
According to SIPRI, Russia boosted its military spending by 2.9% to 65.9 billion dollars in 2021. This marked the third straight year of growth, with spending equaling 4.1% of the country’s GDP that year.
High revenue from oil and gas has helped fund larger military outlays, a trend that began rising again after a dip between 2016 and 2019, notes Lucy Bero-Sudro, who leads SIPRI’s military expenditure and weapons production program. The report highlights Russia’s rising emphasis on missile weapons and the active use of these systems in the conflict in Ukraine.
Analysts with SIPRI observe that over the past six years the Russian Armed Forces have received 17 Bal and Bastion coastal missile systems. Twelve missile regiments were re-equipped with the Yars complex, ten brigades with the Iskander complex, and twenty anti-aircraft regiments were fitted with S-400 air defense systems. A hypersonic Dagger (Kinzhal) system has been accepted for service.
In aviation, thirteen regiments were supplied with modernized 4++ generation aircraft, including MiG-31BM, Su-35S, Su-30SM, and Su-34. Three army aviation brigades and six helicopter regiments received Ka-52 and Mi-28 platforms.
Looking ahead, supplies of new military equipment to the Russian Armed Forces are anticipated. In 2022, the Strategic Missile Forces are expected to field new intercontinental ballistic missiles RS-28 Sarmat, set to replace the fixed-base R-36M2 Voevoda systems. Development on the Sarmat program began in 2011.
Additionally, the hypersonic anti-ship missile Zircon (3M22) is expected to enter Navy service soon, planned to succeed the P-700 Granit in the long-range anti-ship role.
Test programs are underway for the Tu-160M/M2, a multi-mode, supersonic strategic bomber with variable wing geometry. The aircraft is to feature upgraded avionics and engines and will carry new long-range weapons. This bomber is intended to form a lasting core of the aerospace strategic nuclear forces.
NATO weapons in Ukrainian stockpiles face destruction and shifting priorities
Since the 2014 Crimea upheaval, Kiev’s military spending has risen significantly, by about 72%. In 2021, spending reached 5.9 billion dollars, or 3.2% of Ukraine’s GDP.
Defense analysts caution that authorities in the United States and its partners initially hesitated to supply heavy weapons to Ukraine, citing concerns about corruption and the risk of diversion to illicit markets. Since the 1990s, Ukraine has gained a reputation for incidents involving Soviet-era weapons appearing in unauthorized regions. This concern helped shape the early posture of NATO allies, who provided mostly auxiliary equipment such as thermal imaging and small arms.
The situation shifted after Russia launched its operation in Ukraine. On April 21, 2022, a major U.S. military aid package valued at 800 million dollars was announced. Since February 24, the start of the operation, U.S. assistance to Kiev has totaled several billions of dollars, with the latest packages bringing the figure to around 4 billion since March 2021.
According to the U.S. Department of Defense, the critical elements of the aid include transport for 72 155 mm howitzers, associated tractors, and 144,000 artillery shells, alongside additional munitions and equipment for immediate use by Ukrainian forces.
Another element of the package involves the delivery of Phoenix Ghost unmanned aerial missiles, developed to meet Ukrainian needs, and expected to arrive promptly. Analysts note that the overall U.S. aid strategy places emphasis on reconnaissance UAVs, mobile munitions, long-range artillery systems, anti-tank missiles, and air defense upgrades.
Security measures are also being considered to improve the protection of armored and wheeled vehicles. Operational concepts in urban warfare will be refined to adapt to densely built environments, affecting weapon selection, as well as organizational and personnel structures.
Even with large shipments, defense experts warn that stockpiles alone may not guarantee security for Ukraine. Much of the delivered equipment has been lost or damaged during transit to the front lines.
The analysis reflects a cautious view of the conflict and does not represent any single editorial stance. The perspective expressed here aims to summarize widely reported intelligence and defense assessments from SIPRI and US defense officials.