Enemy attacks on targets and troop formations within the country inevitably raise questions about the effectiveness of air defense forces and systems. It should be noted that such assessments are not always objective or professional.
The adversary remains vigilant and has recently attempted several incursions into the country’s airspace. In the Rostov region, anti-aircraft missile forces reportedly destroyed an ultra-high-speed air defense element. The S-200 system has been repurposed for ground-target engagement. Air defense units also intercepted a drone in the Bryansk region.
Was the air defense system ready to engage with Ukraine?
To thoroughly analyze the effectiveness of air defense actions, it is necessary to consider the broader context. Some domestic experts argue that during the Syrian campaign, aviation continually refined its combat methods, while air defense forces appeared to lag and needed retraining on the fly. This view suggests aviation operated more methodically, while air defense forces faced pressure to adapt.
Such judgments often oversimplify the reality. In the Syrian campaign, aviation typically engaged targets at altitudes above six thousand meters, where opposition was minimal. That environment did not demand significant changes in air force tactics. On the other hand, air defense troops conducted aggressive combat operations, steadily improving techniques to counter specific enemy weapons. In Syria, anti-aircraft missile and radiotechnical units advanced effective methods against low-speed drones and multiple-launch systems.
Before the Ukraine operation, air defense forces carried out large-scale tactical exercises at the formation level. These drills created increasingly complex target scenarios and informed the development of sample anti-aircraft missile systems. Exercises trained air defense to repel mass attacks from diverse target types. In particular, the capabilities of the S-400 Triumph against hypersonic threats, such as the Kinzhal, were enhanced.
Meanwhile, the Pantsir-S system has been significantly modernized. It now effectively counters missiles from U.S. MRLS platforms and Ukrainian tactical ballistic missiles on the M142 HIMARS chassis, and even targets like Tochka-U and Grom-2, some with speeds exceeding 1000 m/s. The Pantsir-S system is also capable of engaging UAVs that hover or move slowly, and its relatively low cost per unit makes it valuable during large-scale defense efforts.
During critical operations, the demand for Pantsir-S to protect key assets is common. The airspace above front-line cities has seen heavy drone activity and the presence of various missiles, including HIMARS and other systems. At the outset of hostilities, air defense forces and vehicles were few on the western border, but their effectiveness grew through redeployments from inland regions. Even so, their numbers remained insufficient to meet every demand.
What needs to change?
The decision to increase production of air defense systems and radar weapons has been announced, along with the creation of multiple new anti-aircraft missile and radio engineering regiments. Yet simultaneous implementation remains challenging. To boost effectiveness, organizational and personnel reforms are needed. Current control bodies, such as joint aviation and air defense command posts, can hinder rather than help, as they are seen as outdated and ineffective.
At the initial stage, solid, discrete control structures for both air defense and operational-tactical aviation should be built. Progress should continue with the idea of reorganizing into aerospace defense forces that combine air armies and air defense armies under a unified aerospace defense command. Striking and defensive roles must stay distinct.
Gradual reform is essential. The aim is to re-create at least two air armies along with regional air defense formations in strategic areas, including the East Kazakhstan region, St. Petersburg, and Rostov-on-Don, to secure western borders. Military air defense must integrate into a single automatic control system managed by the Aerospace Forces, reflecting the evolved nature of air defense in modern operations.
Historically, plans emphasized protecting army and front-line command posts of anti-aircraft brigades and missile brigades. Yet the nature of air defense has changed. Front-line missile brigades are harder to defend against, and command posts may be hidden from the enemy, complicating the deployment of air defense units near those centers. As a result, anti-aircraft brigades and military air defense units are often deployed as compact systems rather than large formations. It is important to note that current air defense units can operate independently from traditional air command structures, differentiating them from older S-300/S-400 battalions.
Because existing military air defense systems are not fully integrated into a single control loop, centralized target designation and distribution are not yet guaranteed. In such conditions, calculations for air defense units can miss crucial weather and atmospheric factors, raising the risk of friendly fire. Therefore, rapid integration into a single, cohesive command system is urgent. The overall command will remain within the Air Defense/Missile Defense Command, with no stated intention to optimize anti-aircraft brigades at the expense of other units. Each branch retains its own purpose.
From the peak of operations to date, air defense forces have shown readiness to perform as expected, meeting tactical and technical requirements and delivering strong professional training. It would not be an overstatement to say that air defense troops deserve steady recognition in ongoing operations.