In an interview with journalist Pavel Zarubin, Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke about Finland being pulled into the North Atlantic Alliance. He indicated that Moscow would respond by concentrating military units within the Leningrad Military District.
Putin referenced a period of initially cordial and productive relations with Finland, noting that economic ties had flourished and that there had been no significant issues. He suggested that the fresh alignment would lead to changes because a Leningrad Military District would be formed there, bringing certain military forces into focus, and he questioned Helsinki’s rationale for such moves.
According to statements from the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Moscow Military District and the Leningrad Military District would be established by late 2023, incorporating combined arms and air elements into the Russian Armed Forces. Some sources also mention the presence of an Air Force and Air Defense Army. The arrangement would involve six divisions and twenty-six brigades, with command centers in Petrozavodsk.
What are these new military zones?
Essentially, the discussion centers on reorganizing two historic districts of the armed forces rather than creating new formations from scratch. The Western Military District, headquartered in St. Petersburg, was formed from the Moscow and Leningrad districts during organizational changes between 2008 and 2010. Given evolving geostrategic realities, notably Finland joining NATO, the Western Military District is planned to be split back into the Moscow and Leningrad districts, with a goal to bolster both regions in terms of combat power and personnel.
The process to build up new units involves filling each district with additional formations, including artillery, engineer-sapper, pontoon-bridge brigades, electronic warfare units, and communications brigades, among others. At the start of this year, the Russian Armed Forces were estimated at just over two million personnel, a level deemed sufficient to form additional brigades, divisions, and armies.
How will the situation at the borders change?
There is no expectation of a straightforward, continuous line of Russian regiments along the Finnish border or a blanket fortification across the adjacent 1,300 kilometers. Still, strategic measures are anticipated that reflect the country’s economic capacity to sustain them. Possible steps could include reinforcing northwestern troop groups, deploying missile systems such as Iskander, S-400 air defense systems, and moving aviation assets to the region, all aimed at increasing the effectiveness and size of the recreated Leningrad Military District.
However, there are substantial challenges. Much of the work would have to begin almost from scratch, including basing missile forces, aviation, and naval assets on the Finnish border, organizing supply storage, and establishing a network of repair facilities. Topographic and cartographic preparations would be required, along with building command centers and a robust military communications backbone that integrates with the national system, and a large-scale development of transport and logistics networks for the military.
The task would be undertaken in a relatively sparsely populated, harsh climate region, and budget constraints would limit rapid increases in defense spending on new formations near Finland, especially under sanctions pressure. A disciplined, practical approach is essential.
Effective response to Russia
The ongoing expansion of NATO in the northwestern theater creates a situation where both the risk of conflict and the possibility of averting it coexist. In practical terms, there is no immediate need to fortify defensible lines along Finland today.
A feasible, cost-conscious approach to potential military-technical response could involve leveraging strategic capabilities within the Russian armed forces. This includes potential demonstrations of readiness through strategic deterrence forces and the capacity to execute targeted actions against critical enemy assets if required.
If NATO troops were to deploy on Finnish soil, or if strategic aviation were to operate from forward bases, or if other military assets were redeployed in ways that threaten Russia, then adjustments to the broader strategic doctrine would be considered to reflect the evolving security landscape. The aim would be to align any response with the national strategic framework while avoiding unnecessary escalation.
Reconnaissance and targeting would inform any adjustments to nuclear-capable forces involved in such operations, ensuring that actions remain proportional and capable of managing risk without escalating confrontation unnecessarily.
In short, the approach would be to strengthen readiness and deterrence in the northwest while avoiding a costly, blunt arms race focused solely on proximal border fortifications. Public messaging would emphasize resolve and deterrence, signaling to Finland and Sweden the seriousness of the security calculus without inviting unnecessary escalation. This interpretation aligns with the broader objective of preserving strategic stability in the region.
This analysis reflects a perspective that may differ from other viewpoints within the public discourse.
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