The task at hand is to reassess the outcomes of a broad wave of organizational and personnel reforms within Russia’s armed forces from 2008 through 2012 and even earlier efforts. What looked effective in peacetime often proved inadequate or ineffective in active operations. The analysis below highlights the essential points.
western style
Between 2008 and 2012, senior officials driving reform launched far-reaching organizational and recruitment changes. Many civilian leaders lacked practical military experience, yet they were charged with reshaping the army and navy quickly. They inherited ready-made plans and pushed them forward rapidly, leaning heavily on Western armed forces as a template for Russia’s internal security forces. The guiding belief was straightforward: practices seen abroad should work here too, so they should be adopted without delay.
In effect, the prevailing view treated the West as a universal benchmark. The Pentagon was seen as a source of strategic insight. Fears or counterarguments were often dismissed, and the fact that Western forces had not faced a peer competitor in many decades was not weighed when projecting Russia’s capabilities and needs. Balanced, well-founded perspectives were sidelined, and those urging caution were sometimes marginalized. The outcome suggested that Western models could inform reform, but were not directly transferable to Russia’s unique security landscape and local conditions.
Rushed adoption of Western patterns included the introduction of unified combatant commands conceptually aligned with those used by the United States. In 2010 similar constructs appeared in Russia, but their applicability to Russia’s geography and defense priorities remained insufficiently explored. The result was fragmented command across the navy, aerospace forces, and other branches, sometimes leaving senior services with diluted authority and unclear control over fleets and forces.
- New structures such as a unified strategic command for the Northern Fleet emerged, signaling a move toward consolidated oversight.
- The repositioning of new unified commands, notably near St. Petersburg, reshaped the traditional capital-area military district. Debates at the time questioned whether this signaled progress or distracted from practical readiness.
As administrative reorganization continued, there was a gradual return to patterns that emphasized clearer lines of authority and practical readiness. Squadrons and units began reporting back to service chiefs in the Navy, Air Force, and Air Defense, while other commands and districts were reestablished or reorganized. Some described this as a return to common sense, reflecting a recalibration of organizational logic toward effectiveness rather than a wholesale adoption of foreign templates.
“Brigadeization” of the army
The era also saw an ambitious move toward brigade-style formations, with new brigades created and existing formations transformed during 2008–2012. Notable units such as Tamanskaya and Kantemirovskaya divisions underwent organizational changes to align with brigade concepts. Proponents argued that Western militaries rely on brigades, so Russian forces should too. Yet the deeper questions—whether brigades fit Russia’s terrain, doctrine, and command and control needs, and how they would mesh with modern warfare—were not fully resolved by reformers. As a result, several brigades were later reorganized back into divisions, revealing a gap between theory and battlefield realities.
Across many divisions, elements shifted unevenly when moving to brigades. A division might keep a self-propelled artillery regiment, while a brigade would operate with a smaller artillery battalion; a division could command an anti-aircraft missile regiment, whereas a brigade might retain only a single air defense unit; engineers, reconnaissance, and support components were rebalanced as well. The overall effect could reduce heavy firepower and sustainment in the early stages of a confrontation. Critics warned that adversaries might exploit any gaps in readiness should tensions rise, arguing that Western brigade templates were informative but not universal guides for Russia’s strategic needs.
There was also skepticism about converting storied fighter and bomber formations into air base precincts, seen by some as an overly simplified efficiency drive. Critics argued that the transition required careful consideration of how air power would actually be projected in combat, not just on paper. The reforms sparked debates about optimal deployment patterns and how to balance strike capacity with mobility and sustainability at the core of the force.
Discussions of mobilization and strategic deployment during this period, including how to stage forces for rapid response and large-scale continuity, remain debated. The lessons learned in these areas can only be fully understood by examining later mobilization experiences and their impact on readiness and resilience.
“I crossed a hedgehog and a snake”
Attention must also be paid to structures formed earlier. In 1998 the Air Forces and Air Defense Armies were merged, combining air force formations with separate air defense units. Critics describe the result as a mismatch: two distinct tasks with different aims merged into one framework, creating competing priorities. The air army carries an offensive remit: targeting enemy aircraft, missiles, and command networks; shaping air superiority and supporting land and naval operations; and enabling aerial reconnaissance and electronic warfare. The separate air defense army, by contrast, exists to shield critical centers from air strikes. The overlap of these missions generated organizational tension, suggesting that a clearer separation or a rethinking within a broader Aerospace Forces framework could improve efficiency and focus.
Proposals have been made to reestablish distinct air armies and, where appropriate, resurrect air defense and aerospace defense formations along modern lines. A gradual approach is advised for expanding the force on the western borders, emphasizing the restoration of two air armies and two aerospace defense formations. The aim is to bolster national security while ensuring resources align with strategic needs. Recent statements about enhanced anti-aircraft and radiotechnical capabilities are noted as important steps in this broader program.
It should be understood that the ideas expressed here reflect a specific analysis and may not represent the official stance of any outlet. The discussion remains part of an ongoing examination of reform strategies and their long-term effects on Russia’s security environment. Attribution: Khodarenok, military analysis, compiled from archival discussions and expert commentary.