“Mother of All Battles”
On August 2, 1990, Iraqi forces seized Kuwait, a small nation tucked to the south of Iraq. A puppet administration briefly rose to power, urging Saddam Hussein to align Kuwait with Iraq, restore unity, and join the broader Iraqi nation. The moment marked a reckless bid to shape the region’s future through force, with Kuwait’s sovereignty hanging in the balance.
Saddam then framed the events as a confrontation with Western imperial powers who had influenced regional borders. He also weighed strategic aims: erasing a substantial debt from the wartime period with Iran and extracting value from Kuwait’s oil reserves. In response, an international coalition led by the United States, joined by Britain, France, and Egypt, mobilized troops to Saudi Arabia to restore Kuwait’s independence by force if necessary.
At the time, the Iraqi army stood as one of the world’s largest and most capable forces, equipped with a mix of Soviet and allied hardware and hardened by recent combat. Saddam did not expect a quick victory against American units in open battle. Instead, he sought to anchor a defensive line, inflict heavy losses, and extend the conflict long enough to sway public opinion toward a negotiated end. The reference point across regional conflicts bore similarities to earlier wartime stalemates from decades prior.
When bombardment began against Baghdad in the night of January 17, Saddam proclaimed that a decisive struggle had begun and that victory was near. The American command viewed the propaganda with a certain irony in later years, joking that the initial after-action summaries became infamous for their own grandiose framing, including a tongue-in-cheek reference to a major press briefing.
war in the air
From the outset, the campaign did not unfold as Iraq had hoped. Coalition airpower targeted airfields and anti-aircraft positions. Iraq possessed a layered air defense network, including several batteries of older Soviet-era systems and a number of more modern setups capable of challenging intruding aircraft. The mix of defenses and contemporary fighter and interceptor aircraft gave Iraqi commanders a credible, if aging, shield against aerial assault.
Iraqi pilots operated a fleet that included several advanced fighters and interceptors, while their air defense network incorporated a range of systems from older models to more up-to-date configurations. This created a dynamic where Iraqi air defense could contest some portions of the airspace even as coalition airpower pressed deep into the theater. By design, Iraqi air defense was a factor the coalition had to respect, even as the balance clearly favored the expeditionary air forces of the United States and its allies.
Scholars and analysts point to a combination of factors that limited Iraq’s success in the air. The coalition emphasized technological edge, comprehensive training, and disciplined execution. Large-scale exercises that simulated real combat scenarios helped the American forces to anticipate and counter Iraqi air defenses. One illustration cited involved night operations using low-altitude flights to disable early warning sensors, followed by precision strikes against command and control centers and supporting facilities.
Another example described how decoy and reconnaissance missions drew Iraqi surface-to-air defenses into the open. Under the pressure of rapid air operations, coalition pilots and crews executed coordinated strikes against radar hubs, airfields, and weapon depots, progressively eroding Iraq’s ability to mount an effective aerial response.
With air defenses suppressed in key corridors, coalition aircraft systematically targeted critical infrastructure, including command and communications hubs, depots, bridges, and logistical nodes. The air campaign did not erase the ground threat, but it degraded the enemy’s organizational capabilities and morale, making it harder for Iraqi forces to sustain a coherent defense as the ground offensive approached.
ground attack
On the ground, coalition forces faced a defense crafted along the desert border with Saudi Arabia. Estimates placed Iraqi forces at over half a million troops, protected by formidable minefields and entrenched positions. Front-line troops tended to be composed of mobile, second-tier units, while elite Republican Guard formations stayed back, ready to counterattack if the line began to crack.
The Iraqi plan relied on passive defense and the potential to inflict heavy losses on any attacker. Within such a framework, well-prepared defenders could slow an advance long enough to complicate the coalition’s plan and potentially widen the conflict in time.
The coalition’s Feb. 24 offensive involved more than 650,000 personnel operating in three sectors. In the eastern sector opposite Kuwait, American Marines and Arab partners pressed forward through minefields, aiming to reach the border while advancing through difficult terrain. In the central sector, a concentrated force of tank battalions and infantry fighting vehicles moved to breach the Iraqi lines and target rear defenses. In the western sector, a daring plan involved heavy airborne forces delivering troops far from the front lines to strike a rear position, establishing a foothold for subsequent maneuvers.
The initial ground actions unfolded with mixed results. Iraqi defenders often relied on limited artillery spotters, and as the coalition armored columns advanced, fire control and coordination began to tilt the balance. American field units leveraged counter-battery radar data to locate artillery positions and then coordinated artillery strikes with infantry movements. The combination of precision bombing and close support by aircraft and helicopters gradually eroded the Iraqi defensive posture, nudging it toward collapse as allied forces closed in on Kuwait’s outskirts.
Paratroopers and air assault units played a dramatic role, moving with air cover and facing sustained artillery and air attacks. They pressed forward in difficult conditions, contending with desert impediments and mounting resistance. These maneuvers, supported by air and sea power, contributed to the rapid disintegration of well-entrenched Iraqi defenses and paved the way for the final push into Kuwait proper.
Weapons and armor
With the wings of the attack opening and the minefields overcome, General Norman Schwarzkopf directed pressure at the central front, aiming to disrupt the heart of Iraqi armor. By the third day of operations, coalition forces advanced toward expected locations of Iraqi elite armor, prompting a crisis of confidence among many Iraqi units as retreat became more likely by the hour.
The most notable tank engagement occurred on February 26 during a clash that became iconic in military history. Coalition forces confronted a large mass of Iraqi armor in challenging visibility conditions, including a sandstorm that reduced reconnaissance assets. In close-quarters engagements, technological edge—thermal imaging, armor integrity, and proven crew training—proved decisive. The outcome featured a devastating loss for Iraqi armored formations while coalition units suffered minimal hardware casualties thanks to superior situational awareness and fire control systems.
The following day, another major clash tested both sides in a similarly demanding environment. Though Iraqi losses mounted, the coalition achieved a decisive breakthrough, forcing many Iraqi units to evacuate Kuwait. By late February, Saddam announced Kuwait’s capitulation, and coalition troops reclaimed the territory in a rapid, concerted push.
From the campaign’s perspective, aviation emerged as a transformative force. Guided munitions and precision air strikes repeatedly demonstrated their ability to degrade enemy command structures and rear-area supply networks, even when ground forces were still in contact with the front lines. Yet the campaign also underscored a central strategic truth: air power alone could not compel surrender or secure a battlefield without the presence of capable ground troops to drive the final advances and hold territory on the ground. The lessons from this chapter reshaped military thinking about air-sea-land integration and the enduring importance of committed ground forces.
In later assessments, some historical notes corrected earlier misstatements about weapon systems. The broader picture remained clear: air superiority, combined with effective ground operations, produced the conditions necessary to restore Kuwaiti sovereignty and alter the regional balance of power.