Ten years after the collapse of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, the jihadist group has regrouped and expanded its footprint. Today its influence centers in Asia, with the Afghan branch taking a leading role, and in the Sahel region of Africa, where talk of a potential new caliphate has resurfaced among observers.
The attack yesterday evening at a concert hall in Moscow, which left at least 133 people dead and was claimed by the Islamic State, underscores the reach of a group that now has a foothold near Russia’s doorstep in Afghanistan.
In Afghanistan, the group has grown stronger with the Taliban’s return to power and operates under the banner of the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). This faction carried out a recent attack against a Kandahar bank office, resulting in 23 deaths.
According to Manuel Torres Soriano, a political science professor at the Pablo de Olavide University of Seville who specializes in jihadist terrorism, the ISKP has been increasingly active for several years. He notes that the faction is expanding its networks with the aim of launching violence and returning to the kind of external operations that marked the group’s earlier years in Syria.
This branch is expanding its reach with the intent of projecting violence not just at the Taliban but also to push for external operations that echo the group’s aggressive past during the height of its caliphate in Syria.
Russia attack seen as not surprising
European police and intelligence services have warned that jihadist networks operating in Europe are increasingly linked to ISKP, a trend also seen in Russia where authorities have recently broken up cells. The Moscow attack is not viewed as unexpected; it aligns with a broader rise in threat levels, according to experts. When seeking reasons for such attacks, observers caution against simplifying factors like the war in Ukraine.
For Islamic State, Russia’s role in the fall of the caliphate in Syria and Iraq is cited as justification for continued attacks. Experts say the desire for revenge and to settle past grievances sustains the threat, with the ISKP’s rhetoric emphasizing a clash between what it calls the civilizational antagonists to be fought and eradicated.
Beyond Asia, ISKP maintains a strong presence in the Sahel, where instability in countries such as Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso has drawn in Russian influence and mercenaries to assist in counterterrorism efforts. The Islamic State’s regional messaging highlights attacks on “crusaders” and collaborators, and notes cooperation with local militias in the fight against IS and Al Qaeda, which remains active in the Sahel and even more so in Mali.
ACLED, a data platform that monitors global violence, reports that in 2023 these three Sahelian nations experienced heavy tolls from non-state armed groups, with more than 12,000 fatalities compared with about 8,600 the previous year.
Could Mali become another caliphate
In Mali, IS forces have been responsible for ongoing killings and currently hold Menaka, a province near the eastern border with Niger. The group operates in small, mobile units and often moves by motorcycle, tearing through whatever lies in their path. They now focus on patrolling villages and convening religious gatherings to spread their ideology, raising questions about whether they intend to establish a new caliphate in the region.
In their communiqués, the group claims attacks against “Russian crusaders,” “Wagner spies,” and “Wagner militias,” who are reportedly assisting the ruling junta against IS and Al Qaeda, which remains active in the Sahel and is more prominent in Mali than in other areas. Scholars such as Sergio Altuna of the George Washington University note that the Sahel is one of the main theaters where IS confronts Russia, but he cautions that, beyond the narrative, the Moscow attack appears aimed at sowing chaos in a country emerging from elections, with multiple fronts and heightened tensions with international powers.
While Asia and the Sahel are now the main strongholds for the Islamic State, analysts like Torres warn that the group’s capacity to carry out large operations has diminished compared to the height of the Syria-era caliphate. It remains a threat, but one that operates with fewer resources and a smaller organizational footprint, though it is not a return to the caliphate’s immediate post-collapse period. The continued evolution of IS presence in these regions underscores a persistent, though fluctuating, danger that requires ongoing attention from regional partners and global security frameworks.