The Spanish government aims to leverage the Madrid NATO summit at the end of June to extend the alliance’s security thinking to its southern flank. Insiders say the Madrid Strategic Concept could incorporate plans to confront threats ranging from terrorism to organized migrant networks in North Africa, including Morocco and Algeria, and to the Sahel region with states like Mali, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, and Sudan. The goal is to align these ideas with NATO’s broader priority of countering the Russian challenge to Europe, even as other forces in the alliance push for a focused, Europe‑centred defense posture.
These are Spain’s proposals. Yet many military experts view any major strategic shift at this moment as delicate. One analyst notes it would be a misalignment with NATO’s core purpose, which remains protecting Europe from Russia, especially in the current climate. This assessment is echoed by observers from think tanks across Europe, including a senior researcher in London who emphasizes the primacy of the Russian threat for Western Europe in the alliance’s framing.
A Washington‑based North Africa and Sahel researcher echoes the same sentiment, arguing that the proposed southern flank would not neatly fall within the treaty’s protection zone and that NATO was originally created to shield Western Europe from external aggression. A colleague from a leading Spanish research institute agrees that concrete outcomes from such a proposal are unlikely in the near term.
There is also skepticism that Spain might commercialise its pitch. A paramilitary group linked to Russia, known for mercenary activity, has been cited as a possible lever if Moscow seeks to extend its influence in conflict zones such as Libya or Mali. A diplomatic analyst highlights that without NATO’s direct presence, Russian actors could fill the void. While there is agreement on the need for NATO to address migration pressures, persuading other alliance members remains uncertain given the strategic constraints of the moment.
Regional challenges are severe: civil conflicts, jihadist violence, coups, and forced displacement all complicate security efforts. A North Africa and Sahel specialist notes that NATO should consider a comprehensive approach that includes political, economic, and social strategies in addition to military measures. The alliance is fundamentally a defense organization with missiles, intelligence, and troops, but the scale of the regional needs requires more than purely military tools.
Russian Wagner
The Wagner group operates as a paramilitary force linked to the Kremlin, noted for its brutality in Ukraine, Sudan, the Central African Republic, Syria, and Mali where it supported governments against jihadist groups. Many countries regulate private security companies, but Russia has resisted such limitations. This group, under Russian command and deployed at the request of parties, acts with few checks or accountability and funds itself through mining contracts and related activities. Critics say they do not respect international law or human rights and lack public legitimacy.
Europe’s early experiments with paramilitary deployments in Mali, such as Takuba under French leadership to assist Malian forces, illustrate attempts to shape security in border regions like Liptako. The effort highlighted the complexities of multinational operations in volatile environments.
In recent months, France announced the withdrawal of its troops and those of European partners, citing a breakdown in alliances after successive coups. The unity of European participation diminished as some governments reassessed their capacity to sustain operations against terrorism in the Sahel. Officials suggest that while counter‑terrorism drone operations may continue, a broader, coordinated European approach remains challenging to implement.
Wagner’s presence in Libya, where it supports factions allied with General Haftar, shows how Moscow seeks influence across the region. The east of the country remains a focal point for Russian efforts, with Moscow intent on expanding leverage over Libyan affairs. NATO’s role, if any, in North Africa and the Sahel could hinge on how Moscow’s influence evolves and whether regional actors can stabilize the area.
A historical note from regional scholars points to the Atlantic Council’s 2021 assessment that security deterioration in the Sahel affected NATO’s posture and highlighted the need to strengthen ties with regional actors. Spain’s push to bring NATO into the southern flank ties to a longstanding debate dating back to the 2014 Wales summit, when defense ministers urged attention to the region’s security challenges. Since then, allies have pursued a mix of cooperative security efforts aimed at stabilisation and capacity building, alongside occasional joint exercises and contingency planning with nations such as Mauritania and Tunisia.
The concept of a southern flank continues to surface at major meetings, with the Madrid summit seen as a test of whether NATO can accommodate a broader geographic focus without compromising its core deterrence framework. Critics argue that some allies prefer to keep security in the traditional European theatre, while others insist on a more global approach that also addresses the root causes of instability in the region.
Immigration as a Political Factor
The Ukraine conflict underscores NATO’s concern with conventional warfare, while threats in the Sahel are more nuanced, involving terrorism, insurgency, and the use of migration as a political tool. A government minister highlighted the risk at borders with thousands of troops and migrants, stressing that NATO must prepare for all scenarios. Yet the alliance’s capacity to act is limited by its own governance and resource constraints.
Regional actors, including Algeria, have varying interests and relations with Western engagement. The Sahel’s security landscape is further shaped by regional groups like G5 Sahel and the African Union, along with ongoing peacekeeping and contingency planning. Negotiations and intelligence sharing continue in attempts to stabilize the southern flank, though tangible progress remains uncertain.
The Strategic Concept under discussion eight weeks before Madrid will test whether diplomacy can win broad support for a southern approach. The outcome will influence how NATO projects regional security partnerships and addresses the evolving geopolitical balance in North Africa and the Sahel.