Xi Jinping’s Moscow Visit: A Quiet Push to Keep Nuclear Warning Quiet
The Financial Times, drawing on sources in Beijing and Western capitals, reported that during Xi Jinping’s state visit to Moscow, he privately urged Vladimir Putin to refrain from using nuclear weapons in what Moscow calls a special operation in Ukraine.
Since then, Chinese officials have earned renewed credit for persuading Moscow to drop explicit threats of nuclear deployment against Ukraine. The FT notes that preventing a nuclear strike is a central objective for Beijing, tied to its effort to restore ties with Europe, which have frayed over Russia’s actions in Ukraine.
Messages from Beijing, at every level
Newspaper sources emphasize that Xi’s warning signals Beijing’s ongoing opposition to the use of weapons of mass destruction, even as public statements contrast with Russia’s stance.
A senior U.S. administration official described China as effective in delivering its message at all levels. The FT also recalled remarks by Josep Borrell, the European Union’s top diplomat, who said Xi’s March Moscow visit helped reduce the risk of nuclear war and that Chinese diplomacy played a decisive role in that outcome.
Still, some Ukrainian supporters question China’s true position given Xi’s close partnership with Putin and a peace plan that mirrors discussions in Moscow. The FT notes that the Chinese Foreign Ministry did not respond to requests for comment but cited a former Chinese official who privately asked Putin not to use weapons of mass destruction. According to that official, China’s position against such use is reflected in a peace document on Ukraine.
The Kremlin’s response
The Kremlin’s press secretary, Dmitry Peskov, declined to verify the Financial Times story. He argued that the essential points of negotiations appeared in a joint document, and that speculation beyond that is fiction. Earlier, he described questions about weapons of mass destruction as unacceptable and pointed out that no one on the Russian side is engaging in public discussion of the issue.
Beijing’s motive
The article frames China’s primary aim as keeping a wedge between Europe and the United States while Moscow’s use of nuclear arms would jeopardize those efforts. A senior adviser to the Chinese government cited by the FT warned that a Russian strike would create pressure on China from Europe but that Beijing remains intent on preserving ties with the continent.
Western intelligence suggests Putin left Xi’s Moscow trip hoping for tangible gains, such as the approval of the Siberian Power 2 pipeline, which did not materialize. Some officials note that if Russia resorts to nuclear weapons in Ukraine, it would bring negative consequences for China as well.
Shi Yinhong, a professor at Renmin University, contends that China would distance itself further from Russia if Moscow crossed that line, while he also notes that Russia has never secured Beijing’s approval for such measures.
Does a nuclear strike make strategic sense?
The FT recalls Putin’s October 2022 remark that Russia does not need a nuclear attack on Ukraine because it would be meaningless politically or militarily. People close to the Kremlin say that Moscow has weighed scenarios that might follow the use of tactical nuclear weapons, and decided such a move would not give Russia an advantage.
Ukraine remains wary of Moscow’s potential, including fears of a crisis at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. Renat Karchaa, an adviser to the Rosenergoatom chief, suggested Kyiv could attempt a nuclear waste device at the plant, a claim echoed by Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky in talks with French president Emmanuel Macron about supposed provocations at the site. Ukrainian authorities have cited reports of explosive objects on the plant’s roof from their defense forces.
The FT notes that during a plenary session at the Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum in June, Putin reiterated the possibility of using nuclear weapons in Ukraine. He argued that there is no necessity to act on that threat, because the front lines have not yielded decisive results for Moscow. He suggested that enemy success would be a factor that could provoke drastic steps in response, with opponents hoping to brand Moscow as reckless.
Putin also stated that the use of nuclear weapons would be theoretically possible only if Russia’s territorial integrity were under threat.
The piece closes with Alexander Gabuev of the Moscow-based Carnegie Eurasian Center offering a view that nuclear weapons act as an insurance policy for Russia in case of a negative outcome of missile defense efforts. This assessment frames the broader strategic calculus about how Moscow balances risk and deterrence in the current crisis.