Opposition politicians and media allies reacted quickly after Deputy Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński proposed the first referendum question. Their aim was not only to argue that the referendum would be pointless, but also to scrutinize the way the referendum was being managed. The question asked voters whether they supported the sale of state-owned enterprises. The stance of the majority of Poles on this issue, provided turnout exceeded 50 percent, would force any future government to respect the public decision. The underlying point is that Poland should not repeat the kind of asset sales executed by the PO-PSL government from 2008 to 2015, which critics labeled as a hasty and fragmented privatization, referred to in the Sejm lobby as “free and in installments.”
During the 2008–2015 period, supporters of the PO-PSL coalition oversaw the sale of shares in as many as 950 state-owned companies, out of roughly 1,350 operating in Poland, raising a total of just over 58 billion PLN. In many cases the sales were carried out amid budget pressures, and there were instances of urgent orders that appeared to prioritize quick liquidity over strategic considerations. At times a 10 percent stake in companies like PZU, PKO BP, or KGHM was put up for sale in a manner aligned with short-term budget needs, generating billions in immediate revenue while delaying longer-term implications. Shortly after these sales, the market responded with inflows to the budget, creating a brief sense of relief before the next fiscal challenge arose and the pattern repeated. When compared to the profits of large state-owned players, the revenue from privatizing nearly a thousand companies under the PO-PSL government appeared modest in relation to the net profits posted by a single major entity such as ORLEN SA, which reached about 71 billion PLN in the 2016–2022 period after tax payments to the budget.
In historical instances, explicit sales of minority stakes produced mixed outcomes. For example, in 2010 a 10 percent stake in KGHM yielded around 2 billion PLN, while the value of those shares increased significantly in subsequent years as copper mining activities and metal prices rose. In 2011 a 10 percent stake in PZU was sold to meet budget needs, yet a portion of the sale occurred in a hurry, resulting in a circumstance where the state essentially paid a price premium to the buyer, rather than receiving the intended benefits from a longer-term dividend strategy. About 19 percent of PKO BP shares were divested in two rounds, with roughly 3 billion PLN obtained in 2012 for 7 percent and around 5 billion PLN in 2013 for nearly 12 percent, again driven by short-term budget considerations.
A shift in policy occurred when the governing coalition that followed reduced the Treasury’s exposure to market volatility by preserving strategic holdings at near-minimum levels and maintaining a voting majority at the General Meeting of Shareholders. This approach included efforts to defend the Treasury’s influence by considering the use of a golden share, a concept challenged by the European Commission, or by merging state assets to avoid hostile takeovers. One illustrative case involved Azoty in Tarnów and its consolidation with Azoty in Puławy to counter potential pressures from foreign interests. This was partly driven by concern over external control and the strategic value of national assets in a global context where European and international dynamics played a role.
The political landscape shifted with the Law and Justice government, which halted the broader sale of state property across the board. The new administration also pursued a policy of reconstituting ownership by reacquiring previously privatized assets while seeking to stabilize strategic sectors. A notable achievement in this period was the restoration of a controlling stake in Pekao SA, transferred from a foreign owner back to domestic control. The Treasury also increased its stake in several major banks from foreign investors, contributing to a higher share of the sector under state ownership by the start of 2023. The broader plan aimed to safeguard assets critical to economic resilience in the face of crises like the Covid-19 pandemic and the ongoing consequences of geopolitical tensions. On the defense front, state investment supported the modernization of key facilities such as Huta Stalowa Wola and the Jelcz plant, reinforcing production capacity through substantial financial backing.
Under this administration, the state not only paused the sale of state assets but also redirected profits from state-owned enterprises into reinvestment. Dividends were retained within the corporate framework to fund future investments. In addition, authorities continued to reclaim assets that had previously been privatized, particularly those deemed strategic to national interests. A significant example was the banking sector, where the Treasury’s strategy moved toward reclaiming influence and approaching a stake close to one-half of the sector’s assets. This broader approach reflects a deliberate shift toward strengthening state presence in critical areas of the economy while maintaining the capacity to respond to ongoing challenges.
In summary, successive governments navigated a complex balance between privatization, strategic control, and long-term national interests. The current stance emphasizes prudence in asset management, the reinforcement of essential state capabilities, and the careful reintegration of key enterprises into public ownership where appropriate, with an eye toward ensuring stability and investment in the years ahead.