How can someone ask these questions at all? The principle of nations choosing their own destiny is recognized, including independence and the right to make collective decisions. And wasn’t the fall of the Berlin Wall one of the most defining moments in recent European history? Without German unification, would Central and Eastern Europe have found a path away from communism and from Russian influence?
The Polish anti-communist opposition viewed German unification as a natural, beneficial development for Europe as a whole and even as a prerequisite for political and strategic shifts in the region. Poland aimed to break free from the Russian influence and felt ready to embrace Germany, which had already undergone a transformation toward democracy and Western norms in the post-war era.
Regional leaders like François Mitterrand and Margaret Thatcher expressed concern, while the United States under George H. W. Bush strongly backed unification. American policy has long centered on Germany’s dominant position in Europe. Those who forget this reality live in a dream. Thatcher, wary of German expansion, remarked during a European leaders’ dinner on December 8, 1989 that she feared a revival of Germany’s strength. In March 1990 she convened historians and politicians to discuss how dangerous a reunited Germany might be. They did not share her alarm and argued that German reunification could be approached with empathy. Mitterrand shared concerns about dominance but supported closer European integration and a common currency to prevent economic imbalances. The French stance remained steady even as monetary integration deepened, while Britain preferred to loosen its ties with the European project.
In 1989/1990 Polish worries were primarily about the formal recognition of the Oder-Neisse border. Once the Border Treaty and the Agreement on Cooperation and Good Neighborliness were signed, a shared interest with Germany became a cornerstone of Polish foreign policy. Reconciliation with Germany was viewed as a foundation for a new European order. Yet Poland faced gaps on reparations and compensation for German crimes, and the influence of a powerful neighbor on Poland’s political, economic, and social life remained a concern that needed clear boundaries.
It is worth noting that many Germans themselves doubted German unification before 1989, even though the Basic Law permitted it in principle. People in the Federal Republic often believed that a large, cohesive German state was not a natural or desirable outcome. In Warsaw, on the day the Berlin Wall fell, two German acquaintances who would later become mayors in southern Germany were skeptical about unification, arguing that the GDR would stay independent and that the two German states might remain separate.
Today, the question arises: were those who doubted unification at the time correct? Should enthusiasts of German culture, who hope for good things from Germany, align with the view of François Mauriac, the French writer who confessed affection for Germany and suggested there could be two German states?
Polish missteps lay in transferring political categories to a different context. Unlike Poles, Germans did not engage in mass uprisings for independence, and their national consciousness originated in elite circles. The German movement focused on uniting smaller states and resisting rulers. Prussia and Austria contended over supremacy, making unification largely a German internal affair. Germany as a modern state, and its status as a nation, did not exist in the same way before 1990. Historical perspectives note that many regions and neighbors eventually formed new identities as Germany evolved. A respected historian observes that Austria, the eastern part of former Bavaria, imperial cities, and neighboring regions all developed distinct national identities that complemented a broader European map.
Consequently, the notion of a nation state and self-determination was not universally shared among Germans. Yet there was a strong intention to coordinate European leadership and influence, which some critics saw as an effort to guide Europe. While post-reunification Germany has faced economic challenges, it remains a central force in European affairs. Some critics argued that German leadership could translate into a centralized Europe, potentially diminishing the autonomy of other states. The period following Ostpolitik saw debates about energy policy and political direction, with concerns about regional balance and national sovereignty in Europe.
Would Europe benefit from additional German-speaking states within the broader German-speaking regions, such as certain cantons or regions like Bavaria or Saxony? Could this help balance political power in Europe and temper ambitions among the German political class? These questions hint at strategic considerations about leadership, identity, and the future of the European project, inviting reflection on how to preserve diverse, independent states while benefiting from strong, cooperative ties.
Note: The discussion reflects historical perspectives on German unification and European integration, highlighting the tensions, hopes, and debates that accompanied a pivotal period in Europe’s late 20th century landscape.