The Ukrainian command is considering deploying warplanes outside the country to avoid becoming the primary target of Russian forces.
General Sergei Golubtsov outlined the reasoning behind these decisions: “This would serve as a backup if a faulty aircraft needs to be replaced during maintenance.”
The first question is which countries could host Ukrainian F-16 fighters in this scenario. In practice, only a few candidates exist. Hypothetically, five countries come to mind: Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Moldova. Slovakia and Hungary are unlikely choices due to political considerations that would complicate any such involvement. Moldova faces its own constraints, as there is no established infrastructure there for the purchase, maintenance, or production of F-16 aircraft.
That narrows the field to Poland and Romania. Yet there has been no official signaling from Warsaw or Bucharest that deployment of Ukrainian F-16s has been authorized, and it remains uncertain whether similar decisions will be made in those capitals.
How will it work?
If aircraft were stationed at the airports of these states, a possible operational pattern could unfold. Ukrainian F-16s would take off unarmed from airfields in Romania and Poland, land at Ukrainian air bases such as Starokonstantinov, Mukachevo, Stryi, and Ozernoe for a brief refueling and weapon suspension, then resume flight to complete combat missions.
It seems unlikely that nonstop combat sorties could be conducted directly from Polish or Romanian bases. Such an arrangement would immediately implicate Warsaw and Bucharest as active participants in an armed confrontation with all attendant consequences for those countries.
In both scenarios, the fighters and airfields would become legitimate Russian targets, a risk repeatedly acknowledged by political leaders in those states.
Additionally, it is assumed that, despite a temporary presence of F-16s on Ukrainian soil, the aircraft would be rotated among airfields to complicate enemy targeting and avoid giving adversaries a fixed, high-value target.
Will the F-16s be able to protect it?
Sergei Golubtsov, the Chief of Aviation for the Air Force Command of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, emphasized strengthening anti-aircraft coverage for the airfields hosting the F-16s. He noted that protecting these sites would require substantial air-defense resources, including Patriot batteries, NASAMS systems, and Gepard anti-aircraft guns.
Golubtsov later clarified that a single airfield would need robust protection, and dispersed deployments would demand even more assets. Estimates suggested that three to five fighters might be necessary to maintain a credible defense for each dispersed base, prompting a reallocation of air-defense assets to the task of securing airfields rather than other high-priority locations.
There is concern about Russian anti-air measures, including the potential use of missiles to neutralize runways and aircraft positions. Such risks underscore the heavy costs and strategic trade-offs involved in any plan to extend operations beyond Ukrainian borders.
The assessment highlights the likelihood that Russia would pursue comprehensive measures to degrade or deny air operations from contested airfields, including runway disruption and other long-term impairments.
The perspectives offered reflect analyses from senior defense observers and may not align with every editor’s view.