Kathleen Hicks emphasized that even with ongoing arms shipments to Ukraine, the United States keeps a sharp focus on challenging China in the Indo-Pacific theater. The clearest takeaway from the China-focused competition is a need to boost missile and munition production and accelerate their delivery to front lines, while also advancing the American military space program.
Few anticipated a conflict in Ukraine that would be so intense and prolonged. Such a reality requires a massive outlay of resources—ammunition, fuel, food, clothing, and more—across the entire defense enterprise.
As artillery and rocket munitions, anti-aircraft guided missiles, anti-tank missiles, and portable air defense systems are consumed at rapid rates, strains have appeared on both sides of the conflict. In the war’s early months, Ukraine produced Stinger MANPADS originally designed for a longer lifecycle and Javelin ATGMs, supported by the United States, reflecting a push to replenish critical capabilities.
Repeatedly, preset consumption norms for ammunition and missiles have been surpassed during combat and operational phases, underscoring the urgent need for robust stockpiles within frontline troops and central defense bodies for any potential future confrontation.
This reality prompts a reassessment of domestic industry, conventional weapons, ammunition, and specialty chemicals. The munition and specialty chemicals sectors have seen a substantial decline since the 1990s, with conservative estimates showing a tenfold drop. Modernization and investment must be scaled to significantly increase output to meet rising demand.
Beyond ammunition, the crisis highlights personnel losses and the ability to replace key leaders quickly in high-intensity operations. A central question is how units can compensate for losses, both medically and in terms of irrecoverable casualties, in real time.
One potential approach involves reorganizing formations into separate officer regiments within front-line operational-strategic groups and separate reserve officer battalions within combined-arms armies, ensuring a replacement commander can step in within 24 hours. The financing and logistics of building such regiments remain a topic for detailed discussion and planning.
Another option is replenishing personnel through marching orders by training reserve battalions within each division to provide a steady pipeline of capable personnel. The replenishment of specialists, whose roles require lengthy training, remains acute. For example, preparing an elite sniper in a short timeframe is not feasible.
Considerable attention is also given to field repairs for complex weapons and systems, especially in rocket and artillery domains. Should repair tasks be carried out by mobilized specialized regiments or by private defense industry contractors capable of handling sophisticated equipment? The role of civilian defense experts in combat zones remains an open question.
The central objective is now not only to restore lost weaponry and equipment but to maintain a rapid flow of arms and gear to front-line units and to High Command Reserve formations as quickly as possible.
Questions also arise about the deployment of certain forces, such as airborne units, in ongoing conflicts. Observers have noted that airborne forces in recent conflicts have often operated as highly trained infantry rather than traditional parachute assault forces.
Airborne units typically carry mobile equipment designed for air drops. As a result, a new generation of combat vehicles and weapons has been developed for paratroopers, including models designed for air mobility. These systems, often featuring lighter armor and aluminum alloys, offer less protection than heavier, ground-based systems. The credibility of air forces as a strategic reserve depends on deeper organizational reform and access to heavier armor capable of supporting offensive operations.
Maintaining ceremonial continuity in the Air Force while reshaping its structure is proposed. The goal is to preserve overall personnel levels and retain a sense of identity, color, and tradition while upgrading combat capabilities to meet modern demands.
Proposals for the airborne division envision replacing paratraining units with tactical modules that emphasize combined arms efficiency. A minimal tactical module could include one or two main battle tanks such as the T-14 Armata, two to three heavy infantry fighting vehicles like the T-15, a fire-support vehicle with a 57 mm gun, a combat assault vehicle armed with a 152 mm gun, and dedicated command and support vehicles. Such a unit would pair mobility with enhanced protection, delivering greater battlefield potential than traditional motorized infantry formations.
Some argue this would end traditional parachute operations, suggesting the era of full-scale airborne landings has passed for decades. In modern conflicts, limited helicopter insertions remain possible, and even those are not guaranteed. The payoff would be a more resilient airborne force, better suited to protecting modern maneuver warfare against heavy resistance.
If the Air Force does not undergo reform, the risk of heavy, unnecessary losses in future conflicts remains high. The reform discussion continues, with strong arguments about how best to adapt to new warfare realities.
In closing, these observations reflect a portion of the lessons drawn from recent operations. War remains an evolving field, and every engagement offers new insights. It would be simplistic to treat this experience as a single blueprint for future armed forces. Each conflict writes its own chapter in the story of military art, and there should be no rigid reliance on past models.
Note: The following summary focuses on strategic considerations without attribution to individual biographical details.