Military commentators note that the Russian Air Force has long relied on principles that reflect mid-20th-century thinking, and there is ongoing talk about preparing for substantial airborne operations not conducted at scale for many decades. This assessment aligns with observed patterns in global conflicts over the past ten years, where Russian airborne forces have often functioned more as highly trained infantry than as a traditional landing force. There were two notable exceptions to this trend.
First, on August 21, 1968, during Operation Danube, aimed at seizing Prague, elements of two airborne divisions, the 7th and the 103rd, conducted a landing operation. In December 1979, the 103rd from Vitebsk also carried out a landing. It is important to note that in both 1968 and 1979 there was little to no resistance against these landings.
It should be emphasized again that these maneuvers involved a full landing rather than a parachute drop. Mass parachute operations have not been used on a large scale since the Great Patriotic War. Even with limited recent experience in landing operations, the Air Force has traditionally been equipped with a broad family of mobile combat systems designed for airborne troops. This includes models from the first through the fourth generation (BMD), the BTR-MDM Rakushka, airborne self-propelled artillery mounts (ACS-57 and SU-85), 120-mm self-propelled guns, and 2S9 and 2S25 Octopus self-propelled artillery pieces. These systems were designed to be airlifted from the Il-76 transport aircraft, often featuring lighter armor made from aluminum alloys, and consequently offering lower protection compared with ground-force equipment. This disparity can impact combat effectiveness in real-world conditions.
A related systemic challenge concerns military transport aviation. The Il-76, a cornerstone lift aircraft for domestic airborne forces, was optimized specifically to meet the needs of air-landing troops. As a result, its cargo bay dimensions limit the transportation of certain equipment; many items require disassembly before loading, and some systems, including helicopters and larger aircraft components, may not fit without modification. In practice, some very capable systems are not easily transported in their optimal configuration. Although the Il-76 can theoretically carry a substantial portion of domestic military equipment, practical constraints reduce its ability to deliver the full range of modern gear in one lift. Over the past half-century of hostilities, no battalion has parachuted from the Il-76 on operations, underscoring a gap between equipment capabilities and operational doctrine.
Today, the airborne formations are frequently referred to as part of the Reserve Command, but to truly meet that role they would require a substantial organizational overhaul of the air force and a shift toward heavier, more robust equipment for the landing force—armor capable of sustaining offensive actions in challenging environments.
There is a case for preserving the overall size and structure of the Air Force, while maintaining traditional names, banners, uniforms, and insignia. The idea is to rethink the airborne assault division so that it moves away from lightweight aluminum armored BMDs toward heavier, more protected vehicles such as the T-15 infantry fighting vehicle built on the chassis of the T-14 Armata tank. The division would include a T-14 tank regiment and a self-propelled artillery regiment equipped with 2S35 Coalition-SV guns. In addition, the division would carry an appropriate number of unmanned aerial vehicles to cover a spectrum from light to heavy strike roles. Rather than relying on standard parachute company formations, it is proposed to operate with modular tactical units that can be deployed rapidly and flexibly on the battlefield.
For example, a minimal tactical module might comprise one or two T-14 Armata tanks, two or three heavy T-15 infantry fighting vehicles, a fire-support vehicle armed with a 57 mm cannon, a 152 mm cannon vehicle, a combat assault vehicle with battlefield control capabilities, and a support vehicle. Such a module would offer far greater offensive potential than conventional motorized rifle units while maintaining competitive mobility and protection. In contemporary battlefield realities, armor protection remains a key determinant of success for airborne formations.
It should be noted that the author’s observations reflect a particular perspective and do not necessarily align with every editorial stance on this topic.