In a recent assessment, the Foundation for Applied Economic Studies (Fedea) argues that there is only one way to meet the Food Chain Law, and that is through the public purchase of surplus products. This stance is presented in a press release by Ángel de la Fuente, who asserts that several clauses of the law cannot realistically be fulfilled. He highlights a clause requiring prices to cover the production costs along the entire chain. He warns that even if it were possible to satisfy this rule, implementing it would cause long-term negative effects on sector efficiency. According to him, the only method to prevent sector losses — or something close to it — is to establish price floors backed by public procurement of excess supply.
De la Fuente also notes that this part of the reform does not open any new or promising path for mitigating the sector’s difficulties. For weeks, members of the industry have been marching behind their tractors to defend their rights. The text warns that the reform acts like a double-edged sword: it intends to create a new right for food operators — to recover costs or to sell production without losses — but this would only be feasible if someone is legally obligated to buy that production at a sufficient price. It cautions that forcing such an obligation onto private actors would likely be illegal in Europe.
De la Fuente rules out that solution. He argues that it cannot work in a market economy. Requiring buyers of food products to purchase from producers who are less efficient, while paying above-market prices to cover costs, would incentivize some producers to seek partial cost recovery only if doing so does not trigger larger losses from the sale. That dynamic would further exacerbate losses. The reality, he says, is that the Law is defaulting on its own terms and is frequently not complied with.
Therefore, progress toward the reform’s intended direction hinges on the public sector taking on the role of the last-resort buyer to guarantee farmers the right to sell at a predefined price. This cost-recovery approach could be implemented through traditional price floors. Those floors would be linked to the average production costs for each product, though higher levels could be set if stronger support for the domestic farming sector is deemed necessary, according to de la Fuente.
Setting minimum prices to protect domestic production and small farms at risk of disappearing in Spain and much of Europe could increase the sense of security and independence. Yet raising guaranteed prices would also raise costs for other groups, notably consumers who would pay more for groceries. It would also impact taxpayers, who would fund the purchase and storage of larger agricultural surpluses, and could affect lower-income countries as well.
In summary, the author suggests that only by establishing a public procurement framework as a safety net and by anchoring price floors in objective production-cost benchmarks can the envisioned protections be realized. Without this mechanism, the law risks becoming a regular noncompliance issue rather than a robust policy instrument for sustaining domestic agriculture. The broader implication is clear: political and economic stakeholders must weigh the trade-offs between price stability for producers and the affordability of food for households, especially during market shocks and periods of high volatility. This tension continues to shape debates about how best to align market signals with public goals in the food system, and it remains central to discussions about reform across Europe and in neighboring jurisdictions, where the legal feasibility and social desirability of such measures are continually evaluated. (citation: Ángel de la Fuente)