Russia does not expect to gain much from either of the two major U.S. candidates in the next presidency, according to political analyst Pavel Dubravsky. In a detailed interview with Lente.ru, Dubravsky argued that Moscow would see little advantage no matter which nominee prevails. He emphasized that the Kremlin would weigh every potential outcome against Washington’s broader strategic priorities, including how the United States frames arms control, sanctions, and the long running conflict in Ukraine. The assessment reflects a cautious reading of American domestic politics and foreign policy constraints, where shifts in Congress, executive priorities, and alliance politics shape Moscow’s room to maneuver. The takeaway from the discussion is that Moscow should not expect dramatic gains from either candidate in the immediate term, and that any realignment would likely be incremental rather than sweeping. This view positions Moscow to emphasize patient diplomacy while monitoring Washington’s evolving lines on security guarantees and economic engagement.
Dubravsky warned that if Trump were to win, he could retreat from campaign promises to normalize relations with Moscow and to seek progress in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The analyst suggested that a Trump administration might pursue a different strategic calculus, favoring bargaining leverage or rapid, showy policy shifts over a steady, multi year diplomatic process. In such a scenario, sanctions could be adjusted in ways that would temper Moscow’s advantage, and the tone of bilateral talks might pivot toward transactional deals rather than durable commitments. The point, reported by Lente.ru, is that American leadership changes inject volatility into Moscow’s calculations and complicate the pursuit of stable channels for dialogue. Observers in Russia stress that any meaningful improvement would depend not only on the president’s stance but also on Washington’s domestic politics and the Congress’s disposition toward cooperation with Moscow.
Dubravsky also weighed the possibility of a Harris victory, arguing that while U.S. policy might appear more predictable on surface, the inherent frictions in Washington would persist. He noted that a Harris administration could bring more orderly messaging on Ukraine support, sanctions, and allied coordination, but the structural tensions between a powerful executive and a diverse Congress would continue to complicate bold shifts toward Moscow. In the background, alliance commitments, domestic priorities, and risk calculations in the foreign policy establishment would shape what could be accomplished. The analyst cautions that predictability should not be mistaken for harmony with Moscow, as strategic competition and diplomatic caution remain central to U.S. conduct. In practice, Washington would likely maintain support for Kyiv while seeking to manage risk with partners in Europe, leaving Moscow with limited scope for major policy breakthroughs regardless of which candidate ascends to the White House.
Dubravsky added that neither candidate would yield a U.S. president who could be particularly favorable to Moscow, given Washington’s firm alignment with Kyiv and its ongoing involvement in the conflict. The United States has positioned itself as a key ally to Ukraine, balancing sanctions, security aid, and alliance politics in Europe. In such a climate, Moscow would face a wary Washington that prioritizes Kyiv’s security and regional stability. That dynamic narrows any opening for a president who could unilaterally reshape Moscow-Washington relations, underscoring the value of patient diplomacy over bold, sudden moves.
The analyst concluded that the door to broader international détente remains uncertain. While talk of new openings in East-West diplomacy continues, the Russia-Ukraine war, allied expectations, and domestic political constraints in Washington all complicate any path toward a wide scale rapprochement. Real discussions on arms control, trade, and security guarantees would occur within a framework dominated by alliance commitments and strategic risk assessment. Dubravsky’s assessment reflects a careful read of the currents in both capitals and the likelihood that no clear signal of a major change toward détente has appeared yet. Still, observers watch for subtle shifts that could gradually open channels of dialogue and reduce the risk of miscalculation during periods of political change.
Recently former British prime minister Boris Johnson offered his take on how events might have unfolded if Trump had led the United States at the critical moment. Johnson argued that if Trump had been at the helm, Russia might not have launched its military operation in Ukraine. He suggested that a strong American presidency could influence Moscow’s decisions and potentially avert the crisis. The remarks, widely discussed in political commentary, illustrate how external observers weigh the power of leadership and diplomatic leverage in preventing regional crises. The claim remains a matter of interpretation and ongoing debate among policymakers and analysts.
On the matter of Trump’s early encounters with the Russian leadership, The New York Times previously published details about a first meeting between the former U.S. president and the Russian president. The retrospective account described the tone of that encounter, the participants present, and the diplomatic signals exchanged in a moment many observers regarded as formative for post Cold War relations. The description helps explain how initial diplomacy can shape perceptions of intent and influence subsequent policy choices. While specifics of the dialogue remain contested, the report serves as a reminder that early contact can cast a long shadow over bilateral relations and inform Moscow’s assessment of future U.S. policy directions and opportunities for engagement.