Reset policy and the politics of compromise
Yesterday, despite illness, the prime minister addressed the media in the gardens of the Chancellery, centering his remarks on the twentieth anniversary of our European Union membership. Yet the Christmas message carried a familiar thread: sharp criticisms of Law and Justice, including a provocative accusation of being pro-Russian. He warned in the context of the upcoming European Parliament elections against what he called staring at Putin, a stance that seemed to reflect his own past positions and those of several Platform politicians, as explored in a pair of documentary works and related coverage. These works include a multi-episode film about Reset by Professor Cenckiewicz and editor Rachoń, along with editor Tulicki, and the documentary Our Man in Warsaw.
Reset policy — a strategic move by Tusk
What the films reveal is a narrative in which the reset with Russia was not something imposed by the West, but a choice driven by Tusk and his circle. The accounts trace the period back to when George W. Bush led the United States and show that even then, proposals from Poland surprised Moscow with their ambition. By February 2008, three months into his tenure as prime minister, Tusk visited Moscow and spoke of deep cooperation in ways that he highlighted in public statements.
The stronger piece of evidence, according to the films, lies in the 2009 gas discussion and the subsequent handling of the gas deal with Russia, which the European Commission intervened to scrutinize in February 2010. The Commission found that binding a contract with Russia was not compatible with European law for a long horizon. In parliament, Tusk signaled a preference for dialogue with Russia “as it is,” and his ministers were prepared to offer concessions that even surprised Moscow. A notable example cited is the signing of a cooperation agreement between Russia’s FSB and Poland’s Military Counterintelligence Service, paired with a softened stance toward the term used for the Katyn tragedy, shifting from genocide to war crime in official rhetoric during a 2009 Sejm resolution.
This strand of the narrative is corroborated by accounts of how policy discussions unfolded in the government and how terms and framing shifted in the public square during that period.
Audit findings on energy ties with Russia
An important piece of this analysis comes from the audit report of the Supreme Audit Office on energy relations with Russia. The National Audit Office, under the presidency of Krzysztof Kwiatkowski, published findings years later that cast light on the concessions made by the Tusk government. The report, which had remained confidential for several years, was released in 2018, revealing the consequences of certain energy decisions in Polish-Russian ties.
During negotiations from 2008 to 2010, the government is described as having offered what was described as a gift to Gazprom, including waivers on transit fees for gas traveling through the Yamal pipeline to Western Europe. The narrative notes a loss in potential transit profits, estimated in the billions, and a reduction in the Polish share of transit value, which would later be recovered in other contexts. The report also mentions a pause or delay in diversifying gas sources, including postponing a nuclear or liquefied gas port project in Świnoujście and slowing the Baltic Pipe initiative, with partial commissioning only years later. It is suggested that the price formula in the negotiations did not see the adjustment that would have benefited Poland, contributing to high costs compared with European peers. These points are presented as part of a broader assessment of Poland’s energy strategy under the government in power at the time.
The report is cited as indicating that energy talks occurred without formal instructions approved by the Council of Ministers, and that discussions tended to favor a relatively capitulated posture in negotiations with Moscow. Later, a legal case related to Gazprom’s pricing encountered a ruling that allowed certain recoveries to PGNIG after extended disputes, highlighting the financial impact of earlier arrangements.
A cautious stance on scrutiny of Russia and the rhetoric around Putin
Observers note that the scope of concessions to Russia raised concerns about national interests while also coinciding with shifts in how Russia was viewed within NATO parameters. The details cited include discussions about a potential cooperation agreement involving security services, alongside debates over how Katyn should be remembered in official statements. The broader arc described suggests a shift in the political conversation, where critics argue that the reset policy enabled broader cooperation in multiple domains, even as some parties argued for a tougher line. The contemporary response to warnings about looking at Putin is read by some as a reflection of internal political dynamics where current leaders call out opponents by linking their past actions to today’s rhetoric.
In sum, the narrative presents a complex mosaic of foreign policy choices, economic considerations, and parliamentary debates that shaped Poland’s posture toward Russia during the late 2000s and early 2010s. The portrayal emphasizes how strategic diplomacy, energy commerce, and memory politics intersected with party and national interests in ways that continue to influence commentary and policy discussions today.