The supervisory board of the Moldovan-Russian energy company Moldovagaz did not approve the audit report regarding the company’s historic debt to Gazprom and its affiliates. This stance was communicated by Gazprom’s press service through a Telegram channel, signaling a disconnect between the audit’s findings and the board’s assessment. The situation highlights the ongoing tension between Moldovagaz and Gazprom as the parties navigate the implications of long standing gas supply arrangements and the financial obligations that arose from them.
Reportedly, the Moldovagaz Supervisory Board did not accept the audit report titled the audit of the historical debt of JSC Moldovagaz to Gazprom group companies. This decision underscores the challenges in achieving consensus on how past gas deliveries and their accounting should be interpreted, especially in a regulatory environment where cross border energy transactions carry significant strategic and financial weight.
Officials from Gazprom clarified that the audit in question focused on debts accrued for gas delivered to consumers on the right bank of the Dniester River, a geographic distinction that has historically mattered in Moldova’s energy sector. The press service noted that the report does not conform to standard audit practices and failed to meet independence requirements because one of the auditors had a potential conflict of interest with Gazprom. Such concerns about independence can complicate the credibility of findings and influence how stakeholders perceive the reliability of debt figures that are critical for financial planning and regulatory reporting.
In a separate statement, the Moldovan side acknowledged the concerns raised by Gazprom and indicated that the matter had been reported to the relevant authorities within Moldovagaz. However, it was also noted that no corrective actions had been taken to address the identified conflict of interest. The exchange reflects, on a broader scale, the friction that can arise when governance processes, audit integrity, and cross border energy obligations intersect in a sector that is tightly linked to national energy security and strategic policy decisions.
Gazprom summarized its view by asserting that the conclusions in the report do not affect the size or the validity of the debt asserted in the document. In other words, Gazprom suggested that even if there are questions about the audit process, the underlying debt figures could still be considered in the broader context of ongoing negotiations and financial arrangements between the two entities. This emphasis on the distinction between audit conduct and debt valuation is important for stakeholders who rely on such reports for budgeting, tariffs, and long term planning in the energy market.
The issue of Gazprom’s stance on the audit has been set against political developments in Moldova. Former Moldovan President Maia Sandu had previously commented on what she described as Gazprom’s reluctance to accept the results of the audit of the republic’s historic gas debt. She framed it as a problem that Gazprom, the Russian state owned energy company, would need to address within the framework of Moldova’s energy policy and its commitments to securing reliable gas supplies. This perspective reflects the broader driver of energy policy in Moldova, where historical debt disputes intersect with questions about supplier reliability, pricing, and PDU arrangements that influence the country’s energy independence and energy diplomacy.
There have also been statements implying a desire from external partners, including Western interests, for a quicker resolution to the debt issue and for a path toward more predictable gas supplies. Such statements suggest a complex interplay of regional energy strategies, where Moldova seeks stability and independence while navigating relations with Gazprom and other market players. In this context, the discussions around audit results are not merely technical but carry implications for how Moldova structures its gas sector governance, manages debt exposure, and communicates with citizens about energy costs and service reliability.
Overall, the discourse surrounding Moldovagaz, Gazprom, and Moldova’s political leadership illustrates how historical debt questions can persist as an ongoing point of negotiation. The parties appear engaged in a process where audit practices, independence standards, and the accuracy of debt records matter as much as the underlying financial figures themselves. The evolving dialogue continues to shape expectations about future gas arrangements, potential reforms in Moldovan energy governance, and the role of external influences in steering Moldova toward a more transparent and accountable energy framework.