The United States is pursuing a new framework to replace START III, which is set to lapse in 2026, with a focus on restoring strategic stability and extending responsible dialogue on nuclear weapons control. The administration is signaling readiness to move quickly toward an agreement that codifies verifiable limits and reduces the risk of miscalculation on both sides.
As part of the broader effort, Washington invites China to join negotiations as a participant in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime, arguing that a comprehensive, multilateral approach would strengthen security for all parties involved.
The initiative aligns with a major international gathering on non-proliferation and disarmament, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, typically held every five years in New York. The United States has emphasized that progress on arms control remains essential even amid ongoing geopolitical tensions.
President Biden stated that the United States is prepared to engage in rapid discussions aimed at creating a new, durable weapons-control system to replace START III. He underscored that collaboration between rival powers can advance strategic stability, and reaffirmed the commitment to non-proliferation policies and the principle that nuclear war should never be fought or won.
Biden also urged Beijing to participate in the negotiations under the obligations of the NPT. Involvement by China is viewed as a means to lower the chances of destabilizing military dynamics and reduce the likelihood of misinterpretation or miscalculation during any potential crisis.
Participation in arms-control talks is framed as beneficial for all nations. The administration argues that stepping away from engagement would not serve any country, and continued dialogue is essential for global security.
START-3, the only bilateral nuclear-arms control agreement between Washington and Moscow, is slated to expire in 2026. Both sides had begun outlining parameters for a successor but paused discussions after Russia’s military actions in Ukraine began. The U.S. State Department has indicated openness to a new strategic dialogue with Moscow, stressing the need for credible, good-faith negotiations.
“Bad for Russia”
Some Russian officials have questioned the timing of extending or replacing START-3, arguing that renewing negotiations at this moment could be detrimental to Russia. The agreement’s legacy includes the earlier signing of START-3 by the Russian leadership and former U.S. administration.
Diplomatic representatives have urged Washington to resume contact and begin negotiations soon, arguing that the absence of dialogue on strategic stability raises questions about U.S. national interests and stability in the bilateral relationship.
Observers highlight that the longer the pause, the more challenging it becomes to maintain transparency and to align on verification measures. There is a belief among some that the current phase has reached a critical juncture that requires a renewed, substantive exchange on what might replace START-3.
Leaders in Russia’s parliamentary and diplomatic circles have reiterated that the data-sharing and coordination channels should continue, even as discussions about a broader framework proceed. They argue that the overall trajectory of U.S.-Russia strategic stability hinges on continued dialogue and the willingness to address core security concerns.
Analysts note that the conversation includes questions about the scope of possible limits, the balance between ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, and the role of newer, shorter-range systems in any comprehensive agreement. They caution that without credible verification, extending or renewing limits may fail to deliver the intended deterrent value.
Conditions and consequences of START-3
The START framework emerged from a landmark agreement signed during the early 2010s, creating a structured cap on strategic forces and ushering in a long period of reduction and transparency. It established binding ceilings on ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, deployment of launchers, heavy bombers, and the associated nuclear warheads.
Under the accord, specific ICBM families and SLBM systems were covered, alongside corresponding launchers and the heavy bombers used to deliver strategic weapons. The treaty set numerical ceilings intended to curb the most destabilizing elements of the strategic weapons balance.
According to the treaty’s terms, both sides committed to reducing deployed forces and ensuring a process of ongoing transparency. Historical data show significant reductions in deployed missiles and warhead counts over the lifetime of the agreement, along with exchanges of information and routine verification measures to build confidence between the parties.
As negotiations evolved, the focus has shifted toward how to adapt strategic arms-control mechanisms to new military realities, including changes in force structure, the emergence of advanced systems, and the geographic and political climate surrounding U.S.-Russia relations. The path forward involves balancing national security needs with arms-control objectives, ensuring that any new framework remains robust, verifiable, and sustainable for both sides.