“A nuclear war cannot be won and should never be fought.” This famous line echoed the stance of two Cold War giants—Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev—who helped forge a security framework in 1985 aimed at curbing the global stockpile of nuclear weapons that grew rapidly from the 1930s onward. Today, only the New START agreement, or START III in some circles, remains as a fragile link in that deterrence chain. Its status has become even more precarious after Russian president Vladimir Putin suspended Moscow’s participation in the pact, without detailing the consequences. The question for the world is whether this move makes global security more fragile, and what it could mean for nuclear nonproliferation efforts and the broader war in Ukraine. At stake is not just timing, but long-term transparency and trust among major powers—factors central to any credible arms control regime.
After the Kremlin’s latest remarks, the Russian Foreign Ministry moved quickly to justify the decision, saying the suspension does not imply a blanket withdrawal from the treaty’s limits on warhead numbers and launch vectors. Yet without verification mechanisms, as required by the agreement, it becomes increasingly difficult to confirm compliance. In a climate of heightened tensions between Moscow and Washington, the question of border respect and mutual restraint weighs heavily. Data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute indicates that Russia and the United States hold a large portion of the world’s nuclear arsenal, underscoring the enduring importance of verified limits in reducing risk.
Rafael Loss, a nuclear policy expert with the European Council on Foreign Relations, notes that the absence of agreed verifications—delayed since the pandemic—has eroded transparency and predictability around Russia’s nuclear forces. He warns that the move does not calm the current climate of hostility. Similarly, Sandra Martínez Domínguez of the International Institute for Catalan Peace points to renewed uncertainty and mutual distrust that could complicate relations not only between Moscow and Washington but among their allies as well.
proliferation
Putin’s gesture has already set alarm bells ringing in the West as efforts to slow the spread of nuclear arms face a renewed test. Yet voices in the policy community remain cautious about sweeping conclusions. John Erath from the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation argues that the possibility of a fresh arms race remains unlikely, given Russia’s ongoing financial strain from the war in Ukraine. He cautions against nudging the world toward a new era of nuclear competition, noting that such a race would be dangerous for all sides involved. A prominent physicist and researcher cautions that the current breach of mutual trust in nuclear matters does not help move toward stability, and urges a return to practical security logic: making the security environment feel safer for all players reduces incentives to press dangerous edges.
Experts also remind readers that New START has been the cornerstone of U.S.-Russia nuclear diplomacy in recent years. Other major treaties—ABM and INF—have fallen away, and the United States has faced challenges in maintaining a broad multilateral approach. The international community’s response to these dynamics continues to shape the global nonproliferation landscape, especially for nations outside the two largest arsenals. While some researchers view the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons as a symbolic milestone, many nuclear-armed states have not joined. They argue that national security calculations still rely heavily on deterrence, even as the broader international environment seeks to curb risks.
Experts emphasize that the absence of a comprehensive ban on nuclear arms remains an existential threat to humanity. The lack of robust disarmament progress can encourage other states to pursue or expand their capabilities, increasing overall instability. Still, there is a persistent argument that a universal treaty would require broad consensus that may be hard to achieve given diverse strategic priorities. The overarching takeaway is that any path to greater security must address both the safety of strategic reserves and the assurances that reduce the temptation to rely on nuclear weapons as a final safeguard.
The noise of swords
The implications of Putin’s statement for the war in Ukraine remain unclear. Observers argue it marks another stubborn moment in Russia’s nuclear posture since the invasion. If the United States weighs whether New START should continue to bind both sides, it could influence how Americans perceive strategic risk at home. Domestic political dynamics in the United States also color debates on national security, including discussions around firearms policy in broader security contexts.
Most experts interviewed agree that Russia’s action does not remove global insecurity on its own. Some warn that debates about nuclear testing and other treaty frameworks are separate from the core New START obligations, highlighting a general atmosphere of suspicion whenever nuclear weapons are involved. Analysts advocate for restoring a shared logic of security: steps that strengthen one side’s sense of safety should also reassure the other side to prevent misperceptions from spiraling into crisis.
Governments and research institutes call for continued responsibility and cooperative restraint. The Nuclear Threat Initiative and similar bodies have urged both the United States and Russia to maintain disciplined engagement and clear record-keeping. The hope is to extend nuclear restraint and avoid pressing the red button, keeping the door open for dialogue even amid tense relations.