In addition, two legally binding agreements tied to the CFE Treaty have lapsed: the Budapest Agreement and a side document dated 31 May 1996, linked to the same framework for conventional forces in Europe. These developments emerged amid debates about the treaty’s relevance and enforcement in a changing security landscape.
The CFE Agreement was signed in Paris on 19 November 1990. The document was endorsed by authorized representatives from 16 NATO member states and six Warsaw Pact members, and it entered into force on 9 November 1992.
How could this agreement be signed?
The parties agreed to cap the numbers of battle tanks, armored fighting vehicles, artillery, attack helicopters, and combat aircraft. Each state set its own quotas for these weapon categories, creating a framework aimed at balance and predictability across Europe.
From the outset, the accord proved financially and strategically disadvantageous for the Soviet Union. This outcome cannot be attributed solely to a noble pursuit of global peace under leaders like Mikhail Gorbachev. It also reflected drafting challenges and the involvement of actors with varying levels of expertise, and in some cases, opportunistic or incidental participants who shaped the text.
During the Soviet era, visits to Paris were sometimes treated as incentives rather than formal business trips. As a result, the coordination of words and articles within the CFE Treaty sometimes relied on political appointees, party officials, or individuals close to leadership rather than on technical specialists. When the Main Operations Directorate of the USSR General Staff reviewed the final draft, its experts expressed strong concern about the signed text. The resulting document did not meet the technical and strategic expectations of the Soviet defense community.
Less than a year after signing, the Soviet Union dissolved, the Warsaw Pact ceased to exist, and the treaty’s relevance diminished in practice.
Attempts to update the CFE Treaty
There were repeated efforts to restore sense to the treaty. They included discussions around the Budapest and Tashkent agreements and a Wing Document, but these did not alter the underlying structure of the CFE Treaty in a decisive way.
An Istanbul summit in 1999 produced an updated, or adapted, version of the CFE Treaty that reflected new geopolitical realities, including the dissolution of internal security structures and the expansion of NATO. The plan was to shift from a bloc-based approach to national and regional allocations of weapons and equipment for each state party. However, the adapted CFE Treaty was never ratified by NATO members and thus never entered into force. Even in its lighter form, the treaty remained problematic for many stakeholders.
That backdrop led to ongoing discussions about the best path forward for arms control in Europe and the broader post-Cold War security environment. The core issue remained whether a multilateral framework could deliver verifiable predictability without constraining legitimate defense needs.
“Perhaps the result is zero.”
Apart from the CFE framework, other arms control agreements have produced limited or uneven gains for major powers over the past decades. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) between the Soviet Union and the United States, signed in Washington on 8 December 1987 by Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan, serves as a notable example. It led to the elimination of numerous missile systems reminiscent of the heavy costs tied to disarmament efforts.
After INF, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-1) followed in July 1991, initiating further reductions and closures of launch sites. Yet questions remain about the tangible security benefits achieved and whether the loss of certain capabilities was offset by other strategic advantages. In some analyses, a gap persisted between stated aims and realized defense readiness, leaving a lingering sense that outcomes were not as transformative as promised.
In the ensuing period, discussions about replacing multiple-warhead Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles with single-warhead configurations surfaced, highlighting the tension between disarmament and strategic resilience. Critics argued that reductions could inadvertently weaken national defense hinges or create new vulnerabilities if not paired with robust verification and modernized defense postures.
The Russian Foreign Ministry has stressed that negotiations on arms control with NATO partners require careful consideration of current political realities. The broader issue of arms reduction and arms control is viewed by many observers as a long-term challenge, one that necessitates sustained discussion across multiple decades and administrations.
The perspectives expressed here reflect one analyst’s view and may diverge from other editorial positions.