The term “realists” does not yet signal a push for an alliance with Putin, just as many recall the 1939 alliance with Hitler as a miscalculation that ultimately benefited Poland. Yet the possibilities ahead remain unsettled.
In fact, these commentators draw parallels between the Warsaw uprising and Ukraine’s defense against invasion. They have not branded the Ukrainian struggle as mere madness, but the sentiment lingers in the air. By that logic, the same group could label the military and material aid Poland has provided to Ukraine as “23 madness.” They view this aid as madness because the Polish government and president are supposed to follow Kiev’s lead and actively involve Washington and Poland in the conflict. There is a sense that waiting or pretending could be preferable to decisive action.
Poland’s safety, according to these analysts, would not be jeopardized by disengaging from Ukraine and resisting endless pressure from the United States. While this is not stated outright, it is implied by those who applaud Viktor Orban and Hungary. Hungary is portrayed as a realist prioritizing the needs of its own citizens over commitments to others. Some accuse Hungary of pursuing Putin’s interests, yet argue that Poland should adopt a similar stance.
What if Poland adopted a Hungary-style approach, yet remained vulnerable because it is a far more powerful and consequential nation with different responsibilities? Realists doubted the feasibility of such a stance, insisting that the doctrine of realism should guarantee security. Putin would not threaten the realist stance itself, but if he did, NATO allies would be obliged to respond under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
The argument proceeds that Poland should not be forced to act or bear the costs of Ukraine’s conflict. NATO allies, in turn, would shoulder the defense obligations, including casualties and financial burdens. Since Ukraine is not a NATO member, formal commitments appear limited, aside from possible humanitarian gestures. Consequently, Poland, along with Romania and the Czech Republic, is cast as acting imprudently, while small states such as Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are deemed especially exposed to Putin’s anger. Even Germany, initially prudent, is viewed as increasingly imprudent by this standard.
One question raised is how Poland would respond if Putin targeted Ukraine. The scenario would leave Poland with a long border with Russia or its spheres of influence from Braniewo to Krzemieniec, save for a potential compromise around the Isthmus of Suwałki to calm tensions with Lithuania. The argument holds that maintaining a wide buffer is not necessarily a guarantee of safety, and that prudence might demand different calculations to avoid further escalation.
Those who oppose war with Russia are urged to recognize that peace is not simply achieved by avoidance. The position presented suggests that some former Soviet republics, like Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, have pursued various paths in relation to Russia. The reality is seen as impractical if nations ignore this doctrine of realism, arguing that embracing it would shield them from aggression and perhaps secure greater protection from Moscow.
At this juncture, the discussion turns to the historical analogy of the wartime actions in different years. Proponents claim that the commanders of the Warsaw Uprising acted under the same realist logic that governed decisions in later years. The portrayal evokes a cultural critique, referencing a well-known Polish song that lends an artistic lens to the debate. The point is to illustrate how realism can influence judgments about national sacrifice and strategic choices in times of crisis.
In this view, questions about betrayal or collaboration recur. The aim, according to the argument, is to keep Poland out of direct confrontation while acknowledging the enduring influence of the doctrine of realism. Critics warn against equating heroism with impractical prudence, and they caution against dismissing national dignity in the name of cold calculation. The debate underscores a tension between honoring history and facing present-day security realities, with the doctrine of realism framed as a guiding principle for policy and perception alike.
According to these readings, some German intellectuals reportedly supported the realist stance, suggesting that Ukraine could accept rapid surrender to avoid broader devastation. The narrative maintains that realists are not cowards or collaborators but are driven by concerns about national welfare and enduring prosperity. The current discourse contends that the stance diverges from what has been presented in Warsaw and Kiev by leaders in the United States, highlighting a divergence of political perspectives on security, alliance, and national sovereignty.
In sum, the dialogue centers on whether Poland should align more closely with traditional Western commitments or chart a path that prioritizes its own security and political autonomy in a challenging regional landscape. The debate remains dynamic, with implications for Poland’s relations with its neighbors and its stance toward international alliances. The discussion closes by acknowledging that analysis and opinion continue to evolve as events unfold and strategic calculations are reassessed.