Trzaskowski is viewed as an asset, with the platform seemingly waiting for the right moment, according to a major Polish newspaper. The piece gives the impression that a decisive move could happen at any moment, suggesting Donald Tusk might step forward, with a strong ally from his party riding in to steer the campaign toward victory. These impressions stem from internal party dynamics and from publicists who may not fully grasp how political mechanisms operate in practice.
Should Rafał Trzaskowski play a more prominent role in the campaign, it will likely be to support Tusk. He would mobilize his resources with determination, aiming to secure his own key objective through the process.
There are four core reasons why this is unlikely to unfold in the way some speculation suggests:
1) Tusk did not return to Polish politics just to coast along in the final stretch. To admit an inability to beat PiS would be a personal defeat surpassing even the bold move of defeating Lech Kaczyński in 2005. Such a stance would signal weakness, and the narrative would quickly shift against him from all sides—from the right to the left. His wife has publicly indicated that retirement is not on the horizon for him, so public perception would frame any retreat as a major misstep. The risk to his image is significant, and in political terms, image often matters as much as policy.
2) Tusk returned with the aim of ensuring that Trzaskowski, or any other potential successor, does not overtake his influence. The episode in 2020, when the president of Warsaw energized the party, highlighted the need for a swift counter-move. The adage that the strongest risk often comes from within one’s own camp applies here. Since Tusk has demonstrated leadership that has energized the party and improved ratings, there is little incentive to waste time and transfer credibility to a younger, more modern figure. The memory of joint appearances and competitive energy, such as their public exchange during Campus Polska Przyszłości, underscored the sparks that still exist between them and the potential for internal competition to intensify later.
3) Trzaskowski would face a dependence problem if he became the Prime Minister in a Tusk-led government. In that setup, power would effectively rest with the party’s seasoned leader, who could reassert influence and potentially replace his chosen ally when deemed necessary. Such dynamics underscore the risk of remaining in lockstep rather than charting an independent path to leadership.
4) Trzaskowski appears committed to a longer-term plan, often described as Palace 2025. The question becomes why devote endless days to decision-making, responsibility, and constant scrutiny when there is a chance to pursue the presidency and assume a broader leadership role. There is a perception that the job of managing a large state would be physically exhausting. The path to the presidency, some argue, could offer a more effective way to shape policy with less daily strain, a notion sometimes contrasted with the demands of a prime ministerial role. Even allies note that Trzaskowski may be more cautious in ambition than the most aggressive political performers, preferring to maintain influence from a position that is easier to sustain over time. The presidency, in this view, could be a feasible milestone, akin to past transitions executed with strategic timing.
In this analysis, the focus remains on the strategic calculus of Polish political actors and the possible trajectories within Poland’s party structure. The discussion centers on how reputations are built, how leadership signals are read by the public, and what moves could redefine momentum for the party in a complex political landscape. The broader implications touch on how such shifts could influence the party’s stance on governance, reform, and national priorities in both domestic and international contexts. [Citation: wPolityce]