A heated Twitter debate centered on Gazeta Wyborcza, its journalists, and the editor-in-chief, regarding Vladimir Putin’s Russia. The discussion began with editor Dominika Wielowieyska’s reaction to Putin’s letter to the Poles, published by Gazeta Wyborcza and showcased on the cover on the eve of the 70th anniversary of World War II, a moment that arrived just over a year after Russia’s invasion of Georgia.
Who and what feels humiliated?
Following the remarks by Gazeta Wyborcza journalist Dominika Wielowieyska, many journalists, politicians, and Twitter users today recall Putin’s letter to the Poles, published in Gazeta Wyborcza on August 31, 2009. The piece appeared not only on the eve of the 70th anniversary of World War II, but also, tellingly, a little over a year after Russia’s attack on Georgia. This coincidence prompted observers of Polish and world politics to reflect on Vladimir Putin’s intentions.
“I feel humiliated as a Pole. The authorities violate democratic norms and our allies chide us like schoolchildren. What a degradation and humiliation. Poland is a proud country. It has been a reliable partner and member of the Euro-Atlantic community for many years. Now it feels trapped,” Wielowieyska wrote on Twitter. Deputy Agriculture Minister Janusz Kowalski replied that he also felt humiliated as a Pole, albeit for different reasons.
“As a Pole, I feel humiliated that Gazeta Wyborcza publishes texts by Vladimir Putin in Poland.”
Kowalski was not alone among Twitter users who reminded Wielowieyska of her newspaper’s sometimes controversial stance toward Russia.
On August 31, 2009, readers were asking what it would take for Gazeta Wyborcza to land on the front page: the invasion of Georgia, which had occurred a year earlier.
How was the anti-missile shield?
Wielowieyska’s editor was perceived as implying that an entry about President Lech Kaczyński and Jarosław Kaczyński’s appeal to the Russians might have triggered a trap. Yet the debate did not end there.
In 2010, President Lech Kaczyński accepted Vladimir Putin’s invitation and planned to attend the Victory Day celebrations on May 9, potentially alongside General Wojciech Jaruzelski. Jarosław Kaczyński himself spoke about this in a message addressed to the Russian people—a message that critics at the time described as a political stunt aimed at the presidential campaign, given Jarosław Kaczyński’s status as a candidate.
There are circles in Poland that have long assessed Russia through a lens shaped by Polish state interests, sometimes idealizing Moscow for reasons that are difficult to justify.
Professor Sławomir Cenckiewicz also participated in the discussion. Wielowieyska argued with the director of the Military History Bureau in Warsaw’s Rembertów district about whether Lech Kaczyński’s Moscow visit (which was canceled for obvious reasons, a fact the journalist has at times omitted) and the PiS president’s appeal to the “Russian brothers” should be seen as a genuine gesture or merely a public relations move designed to influence the electoral process. Critics at the time, including some PO politicians and left-liberal media, dismissed it as a calculated stunt, while others believed it reflected a broader strategy in foreign policy discourse.
The argument wove together political ritual, strategic realities, and the perception of a shift in relations with Moscow. It was not a simple reset; it involved a complex set of negotiations and alliances within Poland’s political landscape. The anti-missile shield agreement, negotiated with strong support from certain ministers, faced later pushback and renegotiation in the government, a sequence of events that produced a tangle of documents and debates.
Cenckiewicz offered his perspective in response to the discussion, highlighting the ongoing debate about how to interpret Poland’s security arrangements. Readers were urged to study the anti-missile shield issue further to understand what followed.
Wielowieyska was accused of masking gaps in knowledge about the shield by directing attention to personal attacks. Critics noted the irony of praising many Polish military projects in the past while also aligning with figures who had opposed or hindered defense initiatives, arguing that policy recommendations should rest on a solid factual basis rather than rhetorical maneuvers.
The exchange touched on the broader narrative of the shield’s place in Poland’s defense posture—its supposed collapse under external pressure, and the sequence of events surrounding a 2009 agreement between Poland and the United States. These discussions continued to be debated by observers who questioned the timing, the players involved, and the ultimate consequences for national security.
Witold Waszczykowski, a former Polish diplomat and later a member of the European Parliament, offered his own view, hoping that a committee would scrutinize what some perceived as anti-Polish behavior by the government in relation to the United States missile defense base. The conversation thus moved beyond a single article to a broader reckoning with how Poland’s media and political actors narrate the country’s relationship with Russia and its allies.
It is unsurprising that Wielowieyska should defend Gazeta Wyborcza’s approach, given the newspaper’s long history of reporting on Russian relations and, at times, prompting debate about Poland’s stance on Moscow. Critics argued that the publication sometimes downplayed Russia’s aggression or portrayed Moscow in a more favorable light, a contention that surfaced repeatedly in discussions about Russia policy. The discourse, in short, reflected a charged interplay of media judgment, political strategy, and national memory.
Attribution: wPolityce