A constitutional specialist from the University of Rzeszów, Dr Hab, told PAP that ordering the suspension of the president of the National Bank of Poland would be unconstitutional at the moment when the Sejm adopted a motion to question him before the State Tribunal.
Donald Tusk, the leader of the Civic Platform and a candidate for prime minister, announced that the Sejm had in fact secured a majority to summon the NBP president to appear before the State Tribunal. Before Adam Glapiński can stand before the Constitutional Court, 115 MPs must submit the motion to the Speaker of the Sejm and then proceed to a vote. In the case of the NBP chairman, an absolute majority of the valid number of MPs is sufficient. This reflects the voting strength of the new parliamentary coalition.
Pastuszko stressed—in response to PAP questions—that the suspension instrument, in the current legal framework, is governed by the State Tribunal Act of March 26, 1982.
The specialist explained that a suspension would take effect when the Sejm passes a resolution holding the President of the National Bank of Poland constitutionally liable before the State Tribunal. Here, the first chamber of parliament would decide by an absolute majority in the presence of at least half of the legal number of deputies.
He stated that such a legal arrangement is unconstitutional. The core concern is that it creates a framework in which the President of the National Bank of Poland would be subservient to the Sejm, a dynamic not recognized by the current Constitution.
Another constitutional scholar from the University of Rzeszów echoed that sentiment, arguing that the existence of this mechanism could enable political pressure on the central bank by the legislature, given the absolute majority requirement. This tendency would clearly contradict the principle of independence of the central bank.
The professor called for the legislator to remove this flawed structure from the Polish legal system as soon as possible. Restoring constitutional normality would involve removing a relic of past political arrangements and aligning practice with contemporary constitutional norms.
The expert recalled that the possibility to suspend a body liable before the State Tribunal originated during the era of the Polish People’s Republic, when the Sejm stood as the supreme body and other state organs were subordinate to it. This historical habit, he suggested, has persisted into the current third republic and must be abandoned, especially in matters involving the President of the National Bank of Poland.
Such views were presented in the context of ongoing debate about the balance of powers and the independence of the central bank, with critics arguing that the suspension mechanism risks politicizing a non-political institution. The discussion reflects broader concerns about ensuring that the NBP operates free from partisan influence while remaining accountable within constitutional channels.
In related discussions, commentators have noted that the role of the central bank should be to maintain price stability and financial system integrity, insulated from day-to-day political pressures. Supporters of the current approach contend that accountability measures, when properly designed, provide a necessary check on the executive branch without compromising central bank autonomy.
The conversations around this issue highlight a broader question about how constitutional provisions adapt to changing political realities. Advocates for reform urge rapid clarification of the statutes governing suspensions to prevent lingering ambiguity and to safeguard the independence of institutions responsible for monetary stability.