There is no possibility to suspend the president of the NBP, because there is no collective responsibility, stated Jan Mosiński, a PiS parliamentarian, in an interview with wPolityce.pl. He supported the request of a group of party members backed by the Constitutional Tribunal to examine rules around bringing the President of the NBP before the State Tribunal.
One provision of the Law on the Supreme Court states that once the Sejm adopts a resolution to call a specific person to account before the State Tribunal, that person is suspended from duties connected with the position they hold. The question arises whether the NBP president can be suspended from office following a parliamentary vote impeaching him by the Constitutional Court.
In the view of Jan Mosiński, such an interpretation would be illegal and unconstitutional, hence the move to submit the matter to the Constitutional Court, as he underscored.
He argued that the president of the NBP cannot be suspended because responsibility for the bank lies with collegial bodies such as the Monetary Policy Council and the NBP Board of Directors. Therefore, even if someone brings the NBP President before the State Tribunal, there is no mechanism to suspend him from activities tied to the current office, according to his assessment.
The PiS MP also referred to the position of Prof. Ryszard Piotrowski, a lawyer at the University of Warsaw, who weighed in on the issue.
The chairman of the NBP is a constitutional body that must retain independence from the Sejm. This independence is closely linked to ensuring that the central bank governor is not guided solely by the interests of the parliamentary majority. Even if the president faces indictment before the State Tribunal, this does not automatically justify suspension from office. The Governor of the Central Bank is not a person who can be suspended from office under the State Tribunal Act, according to Prof. Piotrowski as cited in an interview with a business news outlet. Mosiński aligns with this interpretation as well.
It is worthwhile for the Constitutional Court to comment on this issue
Mosiński stated that he supports the line of the professor but added that a final clarification should come from the Constitutional Court. He also pointed to perceived contradictions between elements of the Law on the Tribunal of State, case law of the European Court of Justice, and the Constitution, suggesting that a judicial ruling could harmonize these aspects.
The PiS MP also highlighted the political dimension of the whole matter, noting that opposition actions against the President of the National Bank of Poland affect the Polish economy and the strength of the zloty. He suggested the opposition might be motivated in part by the government’s stance on introducing the euro. He also acknowledged that inflation has been high, even as it has declined in recent months due to several decisions by the Monetary Policy Council. His view was that these developments do not justify actions aimed at the NBP president.
The discussion continues as the political scene weighs the implications for monetary policy and central bank independence, with calls for constitutional clarity echoing across the debate, and with the economic stakes in Poland’s currency and policy decisions remaining central to the public discourse.
Notably, the conversation in political circles reflects broader concerns about balance among branches of government, the role of the central bank, and the potential consequences of invoking the State Tribunal process in monetary governance, as observed by commentators and lawmakers. The evolving dynamics promise to shape how future cases are interpreted under both national law and European legal norms, with implications for the governance of Poland’s economic institutions and their perceived autonomy.
In sum, respondents emphasize that the central bank president operates within a framework that prioritizes independence from the Sejm, while recognizing the legal avenues that could be invoked to address alleged misconduct. The path forward is likely to involve judicial interpretation from the Constitutional Court, anticipated to provide a resolution that clarifies the intersection of parliamentary oversight, constitutional guarantees, and the authority of the State Tribunal in matters relating to the National Bank of Poland.
Notes from the discourse point to a deep concern about maintaining stability in Poland’s financial system while ensuring that accountability mechanisms are applied in a manner consistent with the constitution and European legal standards, as discussed by various legal scholars and political observers in the public sphere.
– attribution: wPolityce