The issue of holding the president of the National Bank of Poland (NBP) liable under Article 227, Section 4 of the Constitution has been described by some legal voices as an approach that borders on enforcing political responsibility. This view appeared in a legal opinion released by the central bank midweek and reflects a broader debate about how constitutional provisions should interact with the central bank’s independent mandate.
Recently, media outlets have repeatedly suggested that the current NBP president could face constitutional accountability before the State Tribunal. The allegations, voiced by political figures from the government coalition, claim that Adam Glapiński has breached multiple constitutional provisions and laws, including Article 227, Section 4 of the Constitution. That clause forbids actions by the President of the NBP that are incompatible with the dignity of the office.
The central bank’s legal brief emphasizes that critics have asserted the head of the central bank violated the standards in this regulation, though no concrete examples have been provided. The analysis notes that such discussions invite reflection on the precise normative content of Article 227, Section 4, and it argues for making the public aware of what the prohibition actually entails.
To illuminate the matter, it is useful to consult constitutional law doctrine. Some scholars have argued that Article 227, Section 4 is written in a way that can be ambiguous, with terms like public activity and the dignity of the office interpreted in different ways, complicating interpretation.
According to the legal brief, the phrase should be read as a prohibition on actions in the public sphere that could undermine confidence in the independence of the NBP’s President, including any suggestion of alignment with a political party or neutral stance. Critics caution that this reading goes beyond the literal wording of the text.
Even accepting the above interpretations, the wording still leaves substantial interpretive doubt. It does not clearly delineate how political activities by the NBP President might cross the line into illegality or behave within the powers granted by the constitution and statutes.
This dilemma becomes particularly stark when one considers that the NBP President leads an institution tasked with implementing a specific state policy—monetary policy—and is distinct from the executive branch in scope and function.
The analysis suggests that, given the central bank’s position, the President inevitably remains entangled in the country’s ongoing political processes. The debate also touches on whether monetarism or statism should guide the bank’s approach, along with legal obligations regarding representation of the National Bank of Poland and cooperation with state authorities in shaping economic policy. Critics argue that these factors could be perceived as supporting any political party, including the ruling one.
Such questions raise concerns about whether a regulation with minimal detail truly enables the central bank’s addressee to anticipate what conduct could constitute a constitutional breach and what would remain permissible. From this perspective, the proposal to establish a constitutional liability mechanism for the NBP is seen by some as impractical and potentially risky for the bank’s independence.
The analysis notes that creating Article 227, Section 4 as a basis for accountability before the State Tribunal would amount to enforcing political accountability by subjecting the bank’s activities to political scrutiny and stigma, rather than purely legal evaluation.
One author of the opinion argues that such behavior would undermine the independence inherent to the National Bank of Poland and run counter to the legal ties between the bank and Parliament. The piece therefore suggests that a more precise definition of the prohibition’s elements—within the scope of the Act on the National Bank of Poland—could clarify the legal framework. If adopted, this refinement might enhance constitutional regulation while providing a transparent legal standard for the NBP President in light of potential liability actions. Still, this is framed as a forward-looking proposal that could be pursued as a legislative amendment.
In closing, the discussion acknowledges the need for careful constitutional refinement, balancing the bank’s independence with clear legal boundaries. The debate continues as lawmakers and scholars weigh the implications for how constitutional liability mechanisms should be structured for national financial institutions, ensuring that national monetary policy remains effective and credible while preserving institutional autonomy.
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mly/PAP
Note: This summary reflects ongoing public legal discourse surrounding the issue and should be understood as a synthesis of expert opinions available in the public domain. It does not represent a formal legal position and is intended to inform readers about the arguments in circulation.