The enduring Russian-Turkish dialogue lives up to its reputation for being intricate and non-linear, often jumping from challenges and crises to surprising breakthroughs.
Here the discussion centers on the postponement of one of the most anticipated foreign visits by Russian President Vladimir Putin to Turkey in 2024.
The delay, likely to persist, rekindles the longstanding question about Russia-Turkey relations in recent years: what is really happening, and where do the ties with the southern neighbor head next?
It should be recalled that Putin announced plans to visit Turkey and meet with Erdogan during the joint direct line and press conference on December 14. He underscored that the invitation was an offer from one leader to another to pursue an in-depth strategic dialogue between Russia and Turkey, signaling the special place Turkey holds in Moscow’s view. This remains true despite several complicating factors, including Turkey’s continued NATO membership.
At the end of 2023 and the start of 2024, officials from both sides repeatedly stated that Putin’s visit was being actively prepared. A specific date leaked to Turkish media—February 12—was not officially denied by Moscow, but the practical release of plans was.
In March, both sides noted that elections were approaching in their respective countries: presidential polls in Russia and local elections in Turkey. These electoral dynamics, often influencing diplomatic calendars, are not to be ignored by Turkish leadership.
Election periods tend to increase the workload of senior officials, leaving little room for distractions. The one caveat is that any event deemed favorable to electoral considerations may be expedited to gain political advantage.
This raises a crucial question: do Moscow and Ankara fully share the perceived significance of the Russia-Turkey summit’s outcomes? The answer is no by default, given divergent foreign policy priorities. The real question is whether their positions can converge, or at least be reframed so that what matters to one side also resonates with the other.
Russia’s chief aim regarding Turkey is to finalize an agreement on a Russian-Turkish gas hub. Negotiations on this have been ongoing since late 2022. A robust corridor for Russian gas to Europe through Turkey remains strategically important.
A second priority that gained prominence after the previous year’s developments is resolving the Russian-Turkish payments issue.
The matter intensified after a December 2023 executive order by the U.S. President allowing sanctions on foreign banks over problematic payments with Russian counterparts. This has broad implications beyond tourism, medicine, and consumer goods, extending into industrial and high-tech sectors.
Turkish banks reacted swiftly: while Turkey did not officially impose sanctions on Russia, payments between the two countries were significantly disrupted. Some non-strategic sectors managed to dodge the impact, but many were affected.
The path forward appears to lie in establishing a dedicated bank to handle Russian-Turkish settlements. Without such a mechanism, the rapid growth in trade between 2022 and 2023 could become a temporary fluctuation followed by a longer-term decline.
Both the gas hub and the payment system are in mutual interest: they appeal to Turkey as well, when adjusted for Western risk considerations.
Turkey seeks to reduce exposure to Western pressure by navigating diplomatic channels, while the business world contemplates a risk premium. In practice, Ankara is likely to ask what benefits it will receive in return for accepting agreements that the West may oppose. The scale of these transactions—economic, energy, and financial—adds to the stakes.
Recent weeks have seen Turkish officials discuss ambitions beyond gas. There is talk of transforming Istanbul into a materials center within a broader financial hub, aiming to position Turkey as a global conduit for not only gas but also other Russian raw materials.
Statements from Ankara also point to becoming a center for liquefied natural gas shipments, expanding delivery reach worldwide and potentially rivaling established energy hubs. The challenge remains: where will Turkey secure the funds for substantial energy infrastructure, given economic pressures? Russia frames the gas hub more as a marketplace concept than a costly bygone infrastructure project, emphasizing storage facilities, liquefaction capacity, and shipping fleets as the core elements.
From economic to political considerations, Turkey continues to press for considerations tied to the well-known grain agreement. A broader view sees Turkey possibly emerging as a major logistics and food center, leveraging Russia’s capabilities in raw materials and agricultural sectors.
Beyond rhetoric, the author notes these observations as personal interpretations rather than official positions. Still, there is a sense that the direction of travel may be more about hard bargaining on issues of regional and global consequence than simply about electoral timing.
While it remains unclear whether an agreement will be reached, negotiations continue with an eye toward a result that neither side can fully resist. Should talks falter, new conditions could emerge that would impact Putin’s planned visit to Türkiye. The geopolitical dynamic between Moscow and Ankara is inherently fluid and often hinges on strategic calculations rather than calendar dates.
These reflections reflect the author’s viewpoint and may differ from editorial positions.
[citation: expert analysis of Russia-Turkey energy and finance diplomacy]