On January 23, the Turkish Grand National Assembly approved the protocol allowing Sweden to join the North Atlantic Alliance, and two days later, on January 25, the country’s president endorsed Sweden’s application. The remaining hurdle for Sweden was Hungary, yet Turkey’s moves signaled to the West that Budapest should not be treated as an enduring obstacle to Sweden’s NATO membership. Sweden’s lengthy journey toward NATO appeared to reach a pivotal moment before observers’ eyes.
Turkey’s swift stance, contrasting with Washington and Brussels, raised a familiar question for Russian publics: what has been observed over the past 20 months? Some asked if this shift represented yet another setback for Russia, which had hoped Turkey might serve as a voice of reason within NATO after a series of official remarks from Ankara.
Domestic sentiment frames NATO’s eastward expansion as a central factor driving the current tension. The alliance’s reluctance to remain within its traditional borders, even after the onset of Russian air defenses, has elevated strategic strain to a new level. Before judging Turkey, it is helpful to assess the broader context: Finland’s accession and Sweden’s expected entry to NATO largely reflect leadership changes in those states and the strong support of the United States. The addition of two members seemed inevitable and procedural at first, yet not substantive; neither Turkey nor Hungary, which holds veto power, can erase Sweden’s and Finland’s applications, but they can slow them.
In Turkey’s official documents, the stance is clear: NATO expansion is not opposed but welcomed, framed as contributing to global stability. While this view may not be shared by all, it has been stated publicly on multiple occasions. The real Turkish question, then, concerns the conditions under which expansion would be acceptable.
Turkey’s official positions summarize its attitude succinctly. First, NATO is not a coalition serving a single country’s interests. Threats to NATO as a whole must reflect threats to the security of all member states. For Turkey, the primary national security concerns are the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Fethullah Gülen movement (FETO). These issues, when translated into NATO terms, imply that new members must recognize threats to Turkish security as their own and support domestic measures to address them.
Second, as NATO is a military-political bloc, measures by some members to curb the military potential of others within the alliance should be avoided. In practice, Turkey seeks the removal of existing restrictions on the sale of military-technical equipment to current and prospective NATO members. On every point, Turkey has voiced concerns regarding Finland, Sweden, and the alliance itself.
Whether Turkey has met Finland’s and Sweden’s demands under the 2022 Madrid framework remains a matter of debate. Turkey has taken steps in some directions, while in others the outcomes are less clear. The pace and scope of these movements have prompted varying interpretations in Russia and beyond.
Attention in Washington and Ankara then turned to the fate of American F-16 aircraft deliveries. The predicament was clear: Turkey’s approval of two new NATO members ties into broader negotiations on defense acquisitions. The Turkish air force needs modernization, and U.S. congressional approval for new aircraft has faced delays. In this context the discussion on whether to finalize F-16 transfers became deeply consequential for Ankara, perhaps more so than the broader Madrid arrangements affecting Sweden and Finland.
With Sweden’s entry officially allowed, the ensuing conversations on Capitol Hill signaled a renewed American willingness to supply Turkish air power. The expectation is that the Turkish Air Force could be replenished with U.S.-made fighters in the future, reshaping regional air power dynamics. The question remains whether this is an act of principle aligned with NATO’s expansion or a tactical step to secure national interests that may intersect with Russia’s concerns in a complex regional balance.
From a broader perspective, there is little evidence of a Western “voice of reason” in NATO emerging from Turkey, and Turkey’s actions appear guided first by national interests. This reality complicates any simple reading of Turkey as a stabilizing force for NATO’s eastern flank. In the Russian view, Ankara’s choices are not a straightforward move against Moscow but rather a alignment of priorities that, while affecting Russia, does not promise predictable concessions in the alliance’s future posture. The implication is that Russia should not anticipate a straightforward Turkish shift in its favor or a symbolic gesture toward Moscow in the context of NATO’s eastward expansion.
There were ripples of reflection within Turkey about how the decision would be perceived in Russia, particularly ahead of President Putin’s planned visit. Observers in Turkey describe Sweden as an enclave within a bloc of current NATO members that shares no land border with Russia; thus, Moscow’s strategic calculus would not be altered significantly by Sweden’s membership. At the same time, relations with Turkey and Hungary—though complex—remain consequential for Moscow, sometimes more so than the eventual NATO decisions regarding Finland and Sweden.
A well-known saying about friendship and impossible demands is often cited in Russia-Turkey relations. In this context, expectations that Turkey would sacrifice its national interests for Moscow’s sake are seen as misplaced. In the railway of negotiations around Finland and Sweden joining NATO, Ankara’s behavior has been driven by its own strategic aims, occasionally aligning with Western goals but not blindly following them. Russia did not rely on Turkey to carry out a defined Western position, and that stance continues to hold overall. If anyone awaits a decisive Turkish move purely to please Moscow, the timing will likely disappoint.
Ultimately, Russia’s approach has been to act with independence on the global stage, recognizing where Western decision-making centers actually lie. The center of gravity, in this view, is not in Brussels, Paris, or Berlin alone, nor is it bound solely to Helsinki or Stockholm, Budapest or Ankara. A nuanced understanding of Washington’s influence remains essential for interpreting NATO’s evolving dynamics and the broader security landscape. Engagement with Turkey continues, with attention given to the many subtleties that shape Russian-Turkish relations. The content here reflects a perspective intended to highlight strategic considerations rather than prescribe a fixed stance.
In sum, while Sweden’s NATO accession holds as a practical outcome, its implications for regional security and alliance cohesion depend on multiple actors and competing interests. The discussion remains ongoing as the alliance recalibrates its posture in light of new memberships, old frictions, and evolving threats.