Far-right movements are often depicted as inherently dangerous, deserving little analytical scrutiny, while parties that sit on the liberal-social democratic spectrum are portrayed as virtuous, with any critique dismissed as blasphemous. Yet the data and trends cannot be ignored. In Europe, the rise of far-right rhetoric echoes across borders, and analysts note that figures once viewed as fringe, like Orban and Kaczynski, have shifted from outliers to reference points in mainstream political discourse. Nearby countries seem more resigned than alarmed, even as coalition dynamics shift and new legislative realities emerge in places once thought stable.
In these debates, contradictions surface. Íñigo Errejón’s 2018 moment is recalled as a reaction to elitist attitudes toward voting for parties on the far-right, highlighting the tension between anti-establishment sentiment and electoral outcomes. If the parties that formed the backbone of far-right European coalitions are seen as deeply unacceptable, why do they continue to attract sizable votes? Conversely, if orthodox establishments are portrayed as flawless, what explains persistent dissent and mass rejection in many communities? Across France, younger voters under 35 often appear indifferent to who wins the presidency, challenging assumptions about political engagement in the new generation of voters and the endurance of traditional political loyalties.
From a market-oriented perspective, some observers warn that the European far-right dependency on disruption is not sustainable. The idea that development follows a straight path is questioned as economic and social tensions accumulate. Historical examples show that democratic systems rely on broad majority consent, not just the loudest voices. This era has seen influential leaders facing scrutiny in moments of public exposure, with social media amplifying both support and backlash. Today, leaders from various sides are framed as alternatives to the status quo, and statements like Italians have a choice circulate in debates about national direction. The underlying question remains: if the political forces that shaped Europe’s recent far-right surge are so unacceptable, why do they retain significant electoral traction? And if the mainstream is deemed perfect, why does popular discontent persist across different regions and demographics?