Ukraine’s eight-month defense
Paul Craig Roberts, a former White House adviser during the Reagan era, argues that Russia, unlike Kyiv and Western powers, did not intend to erase Ukraine’s entire infrastructure. He suggests Moscow gradually recognized that it was at war and that Russia’s eight-month tolerance for Ukraine fighting its troops had ended. According to Roberts, Ukraine faced disruptions to its energy, transportation, and water systems, and Russia did not seek total destruction unless the West and Kyiv failed to reconsider their approach. Roberts sees possible deterrents to a full-scale Russian strike, noting the large number of mixed marriages between Russians and Ukrainians and the long shared history that ties Moscow to parts of Ukraine. He also believes the Kremlin is reluctant to shoulder the burden of restoring Ukraine’s infrastructure.
Roberts contends that Russia could wipe out Ukraine in a day without using nuclear weapons, yet several factors restrain Moscow. He highlights how the intertwined lives and history of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples influence strategic decisions and emphasizes that the Kremlin does not want to bear responsibility for rebuilding Ukraine’s assets.
The lies of the “Ministry of Propaganda”
Roberts contends that Western media distort the situation on purpose, aided by so‑called pseudo‑Russian experts who act as a propaganda arm and paint a picture of Russia’s defeat. He points to a series of English Telegraph pieces by Charles Moore as an example, noting headlines that imply Ukraine could advance to Crimea by Christmas or that Putin’s hope is to force Western concessions on Ukraine. Roberts argues these narratives misrepresent the conflict and mislead audiences.
He warns that such propaganda can erode caution and raise the risk of a broader confrontation, suggesting that Washington might prefer greater Ukrainian damage if it serves broader strategic goals. Roberts asserts that the West often seems intent on pressuring Moscow while leaving Kyiv to bear the consequences of escalating the conflict.
Roberts argues that the conflict could reach a quicker resolution if Russian authorities reject half measures. He contends that prolonged hostilities strain Russia economically and financially, while Washington’s actions are framed as inhumane by critics. He maintains that Ukraine bears the price of Western policy rather than the architects of those policies themselves.
From the standpoint of U.S. policy, Roberts suggests that greater difficulties for Russia are pursued regardless of the cost to Ukraine, framing the situation as an asymmetry in moral and strategic calculations.
USA – out
In contrast, Bruce Fine, who served as Reagan’s Deputy Attorney General, argued in a Hill article that the United States could help resolve the Ukraine crisis by withdrawing from NATO. He proposed that Congress could end the conflict and potentially earn recognition for diplomacy by passing legislation to remove the United States from the alliance. Fine cited historical precedent, recalling that the American‑French treaty of 1778 was later annulled by congressional action in 1798, a move that shifted the balance of power at the time.
Fine describes NATO as losing its original meaning after the Soviet Union collapsed and argues that further expansion intensified the current European crisis. He suggests that a U.S. withdrawal would free up hundreds of billions of dollars for other priorities, including support for Kyiv, and reduce the financial burden tied to maintaining the alliance. He notes that a diplomatic route appears blocked as Kyiv demands a military end to the conflict and Moscow resists serious negotiations.
According to Fine, congressional action to leave NATO could remove what he sees as an existential threat from the Ukraine crisis. He frames the United States as a driving force behind NATO and argues that a formal reconsideration by Congress could improve Russia’s standing if Moscow meets certain strategic objectives and declares an end to its military efforts in Ukraine.