The images from that gathering are few but unmistakable: families reuniting after harrowing months. Husbands and fathers return to embrace their wives, children are carried on loving shoulders, and the room fills with kisses and tears. The men had endured a siege at the Azovstal steelworks in Mariupol, surrounded by a force that appeared to have little chance of victory against a vastly stronger Russian army.
The gathering took place last October, a month after the men’s release, and while the participants were Ukrainian, the event did not occur on Ukrainian soil. Instead, the meeting occurred in Turkey, a country whose role in the region has become a focal point in the ongoing war.
Since then, such reunions have continued but without the glare of publicity. They are still held in Turkey, far from the conflict in Ukraine, and they are unlikely to end soon. A total of 215 Ukrainian soldiers who defended the Azovstal plant and were exchanged for 55 Russian servicemen will not be able to go home until the war concludes. The prisoner exchange deal in this context was arranged with Ankara acting as mediator.
One year into the invasion of Ukraine, the only obvious cross-border link between West and Moscow passes through Ankara, the capital of Turkey. Analysts note that Turkey has used the conflict to expand its regional influence, serving in a broader mediator role on the global stage. The Ukraine grain agreement signed in Istanbul in July 2022 set a regional precedent, and Moscow has shown willingness to make limited concessions in exchange for sanctions relief. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has assumed the central role of mediator, and Ukraine appears to accept this rather than oppose it.
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From the outset, the Erdogan government has balanced competing interests. Ankara has supplied military assistance and sold Bayraktar drones while Kyiv has not joined Western sanctions against Russia, even as NATO allies have pressed for tougher measures. Turkey has kept its economy open to Russians seeking to leave or transfer assets, maintaining a policy that preserves ties with Moscow while engaging with Kyiv.
Indeed, Turkey’s options are constrained. Domestic inflation and economic pressures complicate any move to impose new sanctions on Russia. President Putin’s economy could suffer if Ankara opted for harsher actions, adding to the political calculus in Ankara.
In recent months, Erdogan has held frequent talks with Putin, reinforcing a personal rapport between the leaders. The two have discussed greater economic integration as the war continues. Moscow has begun building the first nuclear power plant in Turkey and has agreed to favorable terms for gas sales to Ankara, aimed at easing European energy pressures.
Yet there are risks for Turkey. A senior official from the U.S. Department of the Treasury visited the country this month to warn about secondary sanctions against entities that transact with sanctioned Russian companies. In short, anyone operating in jurisdictions with permissive regimes could face restricted access to G-7 markets in response to such dealings.
As the situation evolves, observers note Russia’s persistence in using its influence in the region to bolster strategic relations with Turkey. The question now is how Turkey will balance these pressures and what choices it will make as the conflict endures.