The United States has reiterated that it cannot supply fifth‑generation F-35 fighter jets to Turkey while Ankara maintains Russian S‑300 and S‑400 air defense systems in place. This stance was conveyed by John Kirby, the White House Strategic Communications Coordinator, and was reported by RIA News. The message underscores a core condition linked to Turkey’s defense posture and the compatibility of its existing air defenses with American stealth aircraft, a point Kirby emphasized repeatedly in recent discussions (RIA News).
Kirby reiterated that there is no shift in Washington’s position on the F‑35 program with Turkey. The United States argues that using S‑300 and S‑400 missiles within Turkey’s air defense network would be incompatible with the operational requirements and safety standards associated with the F‑35 program. The administration has stressed that the issue is non‑negotiable as long as these Russian systems remain part of Turkey’s defense architecture (RIA News).
In recent remarks, Kirby noted that U.S. discussions with Turkey have touched on the possibility of resuming participation in the F‑35 production program. The condition remains clear: Ankara would need to renounce the Russian S‑400 system. Negotiations on this front are ongoing, and progress toward rejoining the F‑35 initiative would hinge on Turkey addressing the S‑400 concern satisfactorily. The administration remains hopeful that a resolution could unlock renewed cooperation on the F‑35 program in the future (RIA News).
Meanwhile, the U.S. State Department approved a sale to Greece that includes F‑35 aircraft and the necessary equipment to support their deployment. Athens has signaled interest in acquiring up to 40 fifth‑generation jets and a comprehensive package that covers engines, communications gear, logistics, training, and spare parts. The approval reflects broader strategic considerations in the North Atlantic region and the ongoing modernization of European air forces (State Department statements, cited by RIA News).
Several months of reporting have highlighted Turkey’s stated willingness to back Sweden’s path into NATO as part of broader defense collaboration with the United States. While that potential diplomatic support is framed against the backdrop of regional security priorities, it appears to be balanced against Washington’s insistence on Turkey’s alignment with Western defense standards, particularly regarding the integration and use of advanced fighter aircraft such as the F‑35 (RIA News).
Analysts note that the F‑35 program is tightly linked to supply chains, interoperability, and maintenance ecosystems that depend on standardized, compatible air defense and communications protocols. The Turkish decision on S‑300 and S‑400 missiles carries implications for future arms cooperation with the United States and allied partners in North America and Europe. Observers caution that negotiations may take time given the strategic sensitivities around high‑end defense technology and the political dimensions of procurement decisions (RIA News).
From a broader perspective, the situation illustrates how alliance commitments, regional security dynamics, and the politics of arms sales intersect with perceptions of threat, sovereignty, and alliance cohesion. Washington has consistently framed its stance on the F‑35 as a matter of ensuring platform integrity, security of allied airspace, and the reliability of joint defense capabilities. The Greek sale further signals ongoing U.S. support for European ally modernization, even as the United States navigates complex relationships with partner states over sensitive defense systems (State Department summaries, cited by RIA News).