UAV activity over Russian regions and questions of origin
On the evening of August 29, drones were sighted over the Oryol, Kaluga, Bryansk, Ryazan, Pskov, and Moscow regions. At the Kresty airfield near Pskov, four Il-76MD military transport aircraft belonging to the 334th military transport Berlin Red Banner Aviation Regiment sustained varying degrees of damage.
Where might the drones have originated?
The precise flight path of the Ukrainian unmanned aircraft that approached Kresty, located well over 600 kilometers from the Ukrainian border, remains undetermined. Debates followed about potential takeoff sites, including options on Estonian and Latvian soil, with Belarus occasionally mentioned as a possibility.
One plausible scenario suggests that Ukrainian drones can reach distances of 600 kilometers or more without difficulty. In a prior report, a Shahed-type drone was described as having a range of about 1000 kilometers and powered by an engine clone similar to the German Limbach L550E; with access to authentic powerplants from engine manufacturers, longer ranges could be achievable. The feasibility of obtaining several hundred engines is not seen as a major hurdle in the current context.
Guidance systems for unmanned aerial systems exist within Ukrainian forces. Global navigation aids such as Starlink, a satellite network deployed by SpaceX, have been employed since 2022 to guide drones, while NAVSTAR GPS and inertial navigation systems are also utilized. In practice, this means Ukrainian drones can determine coordinates and ensure precise targeting.
Questions arise about why radar reconnaissance did not detect these drones, and why a map of their radar coverage was not shared with national leadership. Turning to detection capabilities, a radar field needs a lower limit around 60–100 meters to timely identify drone activity and enable interception. It is possible that gaps exist along parts of Russia’s western borders. There is also a suggestion that adversaries, with intelligence support, were aware of the radio engineering groupings within Russia’s Aerospace Forces.
Consequently, Ukrainian assault drones could exploit gaps in radar coverage and bypass radar units, reaching the outskirts of Pskov with limited resistance. Night flights and relatively quiet engine noise may have allowed drones to remain unnoticed by residents along the route.
That sequence of events is considered likely by observers in the region.
Why hadn’t similar drone activity triggered alarms earlier?
Small UAVs used for radar reconnaissance often carry a very small effective scattering surface (RCS) around 0.05–0.5 square meters, with many cases near 0.1 square meters. Such targets present a challenge for conventional airspace radars and anti-aircraft systems, limiting their ability to detect and engage them effectively.
Projections suggest a future where aircraft-type drones with RCS near 0.01 square meters could slip past current radar capabilities. In practice, many existing air defense radars would struggle to detect such tiny, slow-moving targets. This implies that conventional approaches may not suffice for countering drone threats today.
As a result, some observers anticipate a broader use of ground observers and visual monitoring at strategic facilities. The idea is to supplement radar with on-site human observation and modern sensing technologies to improve early warning, rather than relying solely on traditional optical sights under low-light conditions.
Another question concerns the use of active air defense tools, including anti-aircraft missiles or small-caliber anti-aircraft guns. Information on the exact composition of air defense deployments at Kresty is limited; reports describe the firing of ZU-23-2 guns, though effective engagement would require timely targeting, specialized sensors, and suitable illumination in low-light conditions.
There is also interest in high-efficiency ammunition for air defense, such as programmable shells that burst near a target to maximize impact. Systems similar to the ZAK-57 family have been discussed in this context, though the overall availability of such systems across important facilities remains a factor in determining coverage across the region.
What might winter bring in terms of Ukrainian drone activity?
The broader challenge remains: how will drone use evolve on the battlefield? Most analysts expect the scale of such drone operations to grow, particularly as winter approaches. The likelihood of assaults targeting critical infrastructure—power plants, transmission lines, heating networks, substations, and thermal plants—could rise as adversaries seek to disrupt energy supply and fuel public discontent.
Preparations are advised: planning exercises, reserves of essential materials, and contingency strategies for critical scenarios should be in place to withstand potential disruptions.
In this analysis, the author’s perspective can diverge from editorial positions, and the content strives to present an informed, independent assessment of the evolving security landscape.