For years Kyiv has pressed Washington to supply anti-radar missiles to counter Russian air defense systems that have devastated large portions of the Ukrainian Air Force and continue to threaten remaining aircraft. The Ukrainian Armed Forces lacked their own means to counter the anti air defense networks of the Russian Federation, making external help a strategic priority.
The AGM-88 HARM, a weapon adopted by the United States military in 1983, is described by military experts as a clever and capable tool designed to counter radar networks and disable radar operations. It is considered to meet contemporary requirements for suppressing air defenses. The description comes from a military historian who spoke with media outlets about the missile and its role in modern warfare.
American AGM-88 HARM missiles are in service with eleven countries beyond the United States, with a stockpile numbering more than six thousand units. The missile is capable of targeting high-frequency radars and is designed to withstand various forms of interference, maintaining a lock on a target even if the radar is temporarily shut down. It operates with an onboard computer that contains visual references to enemy radar stations and launchers, enabling it to identify and classify air defense assets including the S-300 and S-400 families and other systems. The weapon has operational capability in the infrared spectrum as well.
The practical use of HARM is primarily as an aerial munition, with a typical engagement range around 150 kilometers under standard conditions. When launched, the aircraft enters the zone of influence of air defense systems, which carries the risk of antiaircraft retaliation. The question of who detects whom first has long been a defining factor in warfare. There are documented cases of the missile being employed in conflicts in Libya and Iraq, with mixed results that still affirmed the overall value of the system in certain contexts. A regional military expert notes that the missile’s effectiveness has varied, yet its potential is still acknowledged in strategic discussions.
In Ukraine, specialists anticipate that HARM will be delivered to the battlefield using a land-based launcher, which would limit the destructive footprint to roughly a 25 to 30 kilometer radius. This arrangement would leave much of the strategic air defense network outside the immediate zone of destruction, underscoring the need for precise targeting and early detection of enemy starting positions to maximize any potential impact.
Experts emphasize that the full impact of ground-based usage depends on the ability to bring the missile to bear from secure launch positions and to coordinate with air defense elements that can retain situational awareness as the threat environment evolves. The broader implication is that fixed, forward-deployed air defenses may remain a persistent risk, and that counter radar capabilities need to be integrated with reliable reconnaissance and rapid decision-making at the command level. This discussion reflects a broader view that anti-radar missiles are most effective when integrated into a comprehensive air defense suppression plan rather than as standalone tools.
Other analysts in the field believe that ground-based deployment of HARM could resemble a method used by allied forces in the past, leveraging a vehicle system capable of operating from land-based launchers to release AGM-88 style missiles. This approach depends on established logistics, command and control, and the readiness of crews to execute complex integration with existing air defense networks. It also raises questions about scalability and the time required to train pilots and operators to work with the munition and its associated guidance systems, especially when considering cross-service compatibility with aircraft and maintenance infrastructure.
Some observers point out that the United States could also assist with restoring or enhancing Ukraine’s existing aviation fleet while exploring adaptable uses for anti-radar missiles with different aircraft types. The practical challenges include the need for substantial training, the development of compatible guidance systems, and the logistical effort required to sustain a new capability under current wartime conditions. As with other advanced munitions, the path from acquisition to operational deployment includes a careful assessment of safety, effectiveness, and the strategic value of the system in the evolving conflict landscape.
Ultimately, experts stress that delivering high-precision air defense suppression capabilities is not a simple plug-and-play proposition. The process demands careful planning, substantial training, and a coordinated effort across pilots, ground crew, and intelligence teams. The utility of anti-radar missiles in Ukraine will hinge on how well such assets can be integrated into a broader operational framework, aligned with broader air and land campaigns and the realities of the battlefield. The discussion remains open, reflecting the ongoing search for ways to strengthen Ukraine’s air defense and restore regional stability amid ongoing tensions.