Military airbases in the Saratov, Ryazan, and Kursk regions appear to have been struck by Soviet-era Tu-141 Strizh drones. At this moment, the Russian Ministry of Defense has not officially confirmed the use of Swift, leaving room for alternative explanations. The discussion that follows explores what capabilities the Armed Forces of Ukraine possess today and in the near term to launch missile strikes on Russian territory.
What can the APU do?
It is clear that Ukraine’s military-industrial complex houses the design and engineering talent required to develop guided missiles and long-range unmanned aerial vehicles. The Grom operational-tactical missile system, also known as Thunder-M and Lightning-2, is built on a solid-fuel ballistic missile developed in Ukraine by the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau, the Pavlodar Chemical Plant, and the Kharkov Mechanical Engineering Design Bureau named after AA Morozov. Official statements indicate that this missile can strike ground targets up to 500 km away.
However, for the Yuzhnoye MK Yangel (Dnepr) and Pavlograd Mechanical Plant teams, which once produced intercontinental ballistic missiles such as RT-23UTTH Molodets and R-36M Devil, moving the Thunder family into a truly long-range category (fire range 1000–5500 km) presents significant obstacles that remain unresolved.
Public discussions have underscored the role Ukraine played in North Korea’s recent missile achievements. A natural question arises: did Kyiv share know-how or equipment that could bolster Pyongyang’s capabilities, or did Kyiv secure its own progress? Historical references note that Pyongyang was offered support ranging from rocket-orbital systems to high-precision missiles and other military technologies, though details remain contested and speculative.
Against this backdrop, the Ukrainian military-industrial complex aims to develop a missile system capable of delivering weapons with a 3,000–4,000 km range to support the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The use of cruise missiles to strike targets inside Russia is deemed feasible in principle. At the end of the Soviet era, Ukraine reportedly held a substantial inventory of Kh-55 and Kh-55SM air-launched cruise missiles. In total, 946 units existed, with 575 subsequently transferred to Russia, and 483 missiles destroyed on site. It’s noted that some Kh-55SM examples in Ukraine were retained as training stock with inert warheads or mock-ups, though not all material was accounted for or discarded.
In 2001, a major international controversy involved accusations that Kh-55 missiles were smuggled from Ukraine to China and Iran. Six missiles reportedly reached China, while another six, plus a ground support complex, were sent to Iran for testing. The broader implication is a question about the potential for shared technology, yet the official defense calculations show the Kh-55SM’s maximum range at about 3,500 km, a detail that anchors assessments of strategic reach.
Long-range unmanned aerial vehicles present a slightly different set of challenges. The UAV itself is comparatively straightforward in design; the real difficulty lies in creating a compact, efficient engine with a long service life and a precise sighting and navigation system. Ukraine possesses engine development capabilities that could support advanced UAVs. For instance, the Bayraktar Akıncı, a Turkish high-altitude, long-endurance UAV, has benefited from Ukrainian AI-450T turboprop engines, each delivering 450 horsepower. Ukraine’s ambitions extend beyond engines to airframes and propulsion arrangements. At the Arms and Security 2021 exhibition in Kyiv, demonstrations highlighted a multi-purpose UAV called ACE ONE, which has drawn attention for its performance characteristics. The ACE ONE features an AI-322F turbojet engine with a thrust around 4,200 kg, produced by Motor Sich. With length around eight meters, wingspan near eleven meters, and a maximum take-off weight of roughly 7.5 tons, the platform can approach speeds close to the speed of sound (approximately Mach 0.95) and, per Ukrainian design estimates, reach a combat radius of about 1,500 km and a service ceiling near 13,500 meters.
Despite these demonstrations, turning a prototype into a full production line is rarely straightforward. The possibility remains that several prototypes exist, yet a mass-produced variant may still be years away. The practical question persists: what should be done next?
Strengthen air defense of critical facilities
During the Soviet era, the European portion of the country was considered a core zone, yet even then, significant air defense resources were not deployed in abundance, with the capital city in particular receiving special attention. The dismantling and reorganizations of the 1990s through the early 2000s further reduced the combat-readiness and numerical strength of air defense units in this region. Consequently, many critical facilities, including some long-range aviation airfields, remain inadequately protected from anti-aircraft systems.
A pragmatic approach to defending important sites uses a layered air defense configuration. This could involve a regiment of S-400 or S-350 missiles, supported by two divisions or multiple batteries of Pantsir-S systems and smaller-caliber anti-aircraft artillery like Tor-M2, ZPU-4, or ZU-23-types to counter small unmanned aerial vehicles. The essential requirement is a robust radar envelope at all altitudes, particularly low and very low levels, to generate timely engagement data and target designations for weapon systems.
To achieve this, resilient air-defense coverage needs to be established at the defended perimeter or facility by deploying the appropriate mix of radar units, automation, and command-and-control elements. Redistributing forces from within the country or reallocating industrial assets can help strengthen defenses, while some new units and departments may be formed to sustain protection efforts. In the near term, simple, prioritized measures should be pursued.
Initial steps might include relocating strategic and long-range aircraft to alternate airfields and dispersing them in a wing-to-wing stance during peacetime. Expensive bombers might be parked in a dispersed fashion, but in times of heightened tension such dispersal could carry significant risk and cost. The Tu-95MS strategic bomber, once produced at the Kazan Aviation Plant named after SP Gorbunov, illustrates the scale of the challenge: the plant’s production capabilities have diminished, and rebuilding would be a major undertaking. Expanding taxiways, new aircraft stands, and dispersal areas would be necessary to sustain operations during any extended conflict. These considerations reflect the immense financial and logistical weight of maintaining such aircraft in a contested environment.
In conclusion, it is unlikely that a broad, deep strike campaign deep inside Russia would unfold quickly or extensively as initially announced by Ukrainian leadership. It is more plausible that only a subset of systems would participate in any given raid. Still, if enemy UAVs, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles bypass Russian air defenses, the psychological impact of even limited strikes could be substantial.
The views expressed here reflect the author’s assessment and do not necessarily represent the official stance of any organization.