This week, Mexican tycoon Carlos Slim finished a major chapter of his strategy in Spain by taking control of more than 90% of the real estate firm Realia. Through his own vehicle and a partnership with FCC, the deal exceeded 137 million euros after years of boardroom maneuvering.
To understand Slim’s bold move in Spain, it helps to go back to 2014. Spain was grappling with one of the deepest financial crises of its modern history. Real estate and infrastructure companies bore the brunt, burdened by excessive debt built up before the bust of the housing market, a debt load that pushed many firms toward bankruptcy or painful restructurings.
Against this backdrop, Slim stepped into Fomento de Construcciones y Contratas, commonly known as FCC. In 2014, with the Koplowitz family as the principal shareholders, the magnate injected 1.7 billion into the company and entered as a shareholder for the first time, holding roughly 25%. Over the next decade, Slim did not stop there; he relentlessly accumulated shares and now owns about 81.5% of FCC, a stake valued at nearly 4.4 billion euros.
Parallel to his FCC involvement, Slim did the same with Realia, the real estate affiliate of the group. FCC’s rescue also proved to be a lifeline for the promoter and asset holder within the conglomerate. Yet Slim’s ambitions did not end there. Over the years, he gradually bought further stake packages, eventually acquiring the final 15% of Polygon, which involved difficult battles over how to value the company’s assets.
With more than 90% of the shares under his control, Slim would be justified in launching a public offer for the remaining minority stakes, potentially forcing a delisting from the stock market. However, sources close to the matter say his immediate plans do not point in that direction. His approach appears to be moving along a different path.
Metrovacesa, a second phase
In 2020, Slim launched a second drive into the publicly traded promoter sector by purchasing around 3% of Metrovacesa and a similar slice of Quabit (the successor to Astroc). At that time, observers doubted these were merely financial plays. Quabit proved a poor bet: barely a year later, Neinor Homes acquired it through a nearly unopposed public offer. Metrovacesa, however, remained a different story, with major ownership by Banco Santander and BBVA, and Slim quietly expanded his position.
Two years later, in 2022, holding about 5.4% of Metrovacesa, Slim issued his first real test to the banks that controlled the developer: a 24% stake buy with a 20% premium, offering 7.8 euros per share, a price similar to today. The offer was accepted by only around 11.5% of participants, yet it nudged Slim’s position above 17%, ahead of Santander’s almost 50% and BBVA’s above 20%. After this move, Slim kept acquiring shares and, by October of the previous year, stood as the second-largest participant, surpassing the bank led by Jose Antonio Goirigolzarri.
Why haven’t the banks sold? The reason lies in the way they value their stakes. Banks record their holdings on balance sheets based on net asset value rather than market price. This means Santander valued its Metrovacesa stake at roughly 899 million euros at end-2023, well above the market value of 581 million. BBVA, by contrast, valued its stake at about 259 million, close to the market price of 245 million.
The next natural step in Slim’s strategy, if pursued, could be to buy the remaining BBVA stake, leveling the playing field with Banco Santander in the boardroom. Even Banco Sabadell has weighed in, signaling that a deal could be possible at about 8.2 euros per Metrovacesa share, versus roughly 7.75 euros in the last session.
The unfolding plan is to move toward a Metrovacesa–Realia merger. Both are developers with land inherited largely from the 2008 real estate collapse and share very similar business models. In this arena, the land is scarce real estate input, and economies of scale play a decisive role: the more homes built, the higher the efficiency and profitability. Talking about a Metrovacesa–Realia merger implies big questions about timing and outcome—years, perhaps as many as a decade, given how long Slim has already pursued Realia. For now, the Metrovacesa path has barely moved beyond early stages, with just four years since the initial Metrovacesa investment and many more to come.
Cited analysis and market commentary indicate that Slim’s strategy blends long-term control with selective asset optimization, often leveraging partnerships and capital injections to reshape ownership and influence corporate governance. This approach has drawn attention not only for its scale but for how it reshapes the competitive landscape in Spanish real estate and development.
Experts caution that the road to a definitive consolidation remains long and uncertain, impacted by regulatory scrutiny, market cycles, and the complex web of high-profile lenders and shareholders. The evolving dynamic continues to be watched by investors who weigh the implications for asset values, future financing, and the strategic direction of the companies involved. All signs point to a patient, calculated play rather than a rapid, high-risk takeover. In this ongoing saga, Slim’s influence on Spain’s property development sector appears set to persist, with potential reverberations across the broader European real estate market. All statements are based on public records and market briefings noted by industry observers and analysts.