Russia’s Latin American Ties: Momentum, Mediation, and Economic Steps

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Russia seeks to build momentum on its Latin American strategy amid growing scrutiny over the Ukraine invasion. From a near-munificent win against Cuba to festive greetings for Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega on his birthday, and new steps to deepen ties between Moscow and Caracas, these signals align with Vladimir Putin’s approach to the region. The Kremlin eyes the BRICS bloc — Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa — as a gateway to new opportunities, with Brazil standing out as a favored partner. The group’s recent Saint Petersburg summit featured Latin American businessmen and guests such as Bolivia, where the state-backed Uranium One Group has plans to begin lithium mining. Moscow also aims to project pragmatism, signaling bridges to Argentina. It is run by a government on the far right.

Since the mid-1990s, Russian foreign policy, initially shaped by Foreign Minister Evguéni Primakov and now guided by Sergei Lavrov, has treated Latin America as a cornerstone of a broader effort toward multipolar international order. The invasion of Ukraine paused this momentum. While the region has not publicly condemned the aggression, the stance toward Moscow has noticeably shifted since February 2022.

At present, Russia maintains privileged ties with Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, places that often silence criticism of Putin’s objectives. Bolivia abstained from a condemnation vote. Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina condemned the invasion but sought to distance themselves from US and European positions. Colombia’s President Gustavo Petro told the United Nations General Assembly that Russia should not be supplied with weapons to prolong the war, reiterating a stance of neutrality and peace. Chile and Uruguay have moved away from Moscow, with Chile’s Gabriel Boric and Uruguay’s Luis Lacalle Pou taking decisive steps in that direction.

“Common interests”

Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva attempted to mediate between Moscow and Kyiv, but the effort did not bear fruit. Media reports suggest Lula rejected Ukrainian president Volodímir Zelensky’s attendance at the Buenos Aires events surrounding Javier Milei’s inauguration. After embracing a more right-leaning stance in the region, Zelensky emphasized the importance of a strong Latin American voice in support of Ukraine.

Moscow watched from a distance, claiming an interest in strengthening bilateral relations with Buenos Aires despite ideological shifts. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov spoke of prioritizing shared interests. The discussion touched on wider economic questions, including the dollarization of economies and how domestic stability might shape regional ties. The phrase common interests appears to mask diverse motives in different capitals, especially among those with closer political alignments.

A notable sign of growing influence appeared when the Russian football team played in Havana, signaling more than a sporting win. The match ended decisively, underscoring a perception of Moscow’s supremacy in both sport and diplomacy.

Cuba owes about $2.3 billion, a debt being restructured as Havana faces repayment pressures. Moscow’s economic footprint has deepened, exemplified by the visit of Boris Titov, head of the Russia-Cuba Business Council, and by the widened use of Mir debit cards and Russian payment alternatives at Cuban terminals, marking a tangible easing of financial frictions for travelers and merchants alike.

Maduro’s ally

In Caracas, dollarization trends are gaining momentum, and Moscow along with oil major Rosneft has provided substantial loans and credit lines since 2006. Putin is preparing to sign a broader partnership and strategic cooperation agreement with Venezuela, reinforcing long-standing energy and political ties.

Nicolás Maduro has signaled the need to travel to Moscow before year’s end. Venezuelan Foreign Minister Yván Gil described relations as being at their strongest moment yet, with both governments sharing core principles on multilateral forums. In late 2024, the Kremlin’s stance on Essequibo was clarified by Russian officials, who urged resolving the Venezuela-Guyana border dispute through peaceful means, good neighborliness, and adherence to international law. The dialogue drew attention from Washington and added another layer to Moscow’s diplomacy in the region.

The presence of Russian media in Spanish-speaking markets continues to draw interpretation. Before the Ukraine invasion, RT served a large audience, but platforms such as YouTube have restricted many RT outlets. Despite those restrictions, some observers in the United States highlighted claims of a persistent, well-funded information effort spanning multiple Latin American countries. These developments have prompted discussion about influence and media strategy in the region.

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