In the speech, the speaker notes ongoing construction in different parts of the country and adds that two fresh vectors are taking shape with radar installations and complexes in the Far East and the North-West, without providing specific details.
Gazeta.ru reported that after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the Unified Missile Attack Warning System (SPRN) largely disappeared. A large portion of the radio engineering units that formed the system remained in the newly independent states. Some of these states later allowed the continued use of early warning radars, but many radars were shut down or destroyed, as happened in Latvia.
Even during the Soviet era, the missile attack warning system showed notable gaps. Notably, the northeastern sector fell outside its reach, meaning the USSR might not have had a truly comprehensive warning network at that time.
Construction of an early-warning radar station in Yeniseisk (Krasnoyarsk Territory) began in the 1970s and 1980s to close the northeastern gap. At the insistence of the American side, under the pretext of violating the 1972 ABM Treaty, the radar was dismantled entirely.
Thus, Russia inherited from the USSR a warning system with meaningful loopholes that did not fully guarantee national security.
The 1990s stand out as the darkest period for SPRN, with little funding for its development. It was not until the second half of the 2000s that a pivot occurred: new Voronezh-type radars began to rise, marking a significant upgrade in the system.
Radar 77YA6 “Voronezh” is a stationary, over-the-horizon radar with high factory readiness. Its variants operate in both the meter and decimeter/centimeter bands, each bringing distinct advantages and drawbacks.
The Voronezh installation comprises a transceiver unit with an active phased antenna array, a modular building for personnel, and several containers housing electronic equipment.
Its high factory readiness and modular approach allow the Voronezh to be built in a year to a year and a half, a fraction of the time required for earlier radars like “Daryal” or “Dnepr,” which often took half a decade or more.
Today, Voronezh equipment is commonly delivered in container form for on-site assembly on prepared concrete pads.
Compared to older systems, Voronezh consumes far less power—about 0.7 MW. By contrast, a Daryal radar stationed in the Azerbaijani village of Kutkashen during the Soviet era drew around 50 MW, a load spanning much of the nearby Mingachevir hydroelectric capacity.
Several variants of the Voronezh family exist, many developed with input from specialists at the Radio Engineering Institute and RTI Systems, including AL Mints.
The Voronezh-M operates in the meter band with a detection range up to about 6,000 km.
The Voronezh-DM uses the decimeter band, offering horizontal detection up to 6,000 km and vertical coverage up to 8,000 km, and it can track up to 500 targets simultaneously.
The Voronezh-VP, a higher-performance iteration, draws up to 10 MW and represents an evolution of the M version in the VHF band.
The Voronezh-SM positioner works in the centimeter band, while the Voronezh-MSM can operate in both meter and centimeter bands.
Current deployments place Voronezh-DM across Armavir, Barnaul, Yeniseisk, and several other locations, including the Kaliningrad Region and the Amur Region, with multiple sites actively expanding. Voronezh-M units are deployed in Lekhtusi, Orsk, Usolye-Sibirskoye, Irkutsk, and Vorkuta, among others.
In Sevastopol, Cape Hersones is the site for the 116Zh6 complex, a multi-band Voronezh variant under construction that will operate across four bands at once.
Olenegorsk in the Murmansk region is seeing progress on the 113Zh6 Voronezh-DM-VP, intended to replace the legacy Dnepr radar previously stationed there.
There is reason to believe these are the final two early-warning radar installations mentioned by General Designer Sergey Boev when he spoke of simultaneous construction in the south and the north.
Widening the Voronezh radar range is expected to close missile-prone directions to the northwest, southwest, south, and southeast, significantly strengthening the national warning network.
In this scenario, Russia’s missile attack warning system would become fully capable, with gaps from the past eliminated and the system upgraded to a new era of performance.
A space-based component is planned alongside over-horizon radars, aligning with the ongoing missile attack warning system project. This approach would greatly expand detection capabilities by identifying ballistic missiles at launch, enhancing early warning and response options.
The solution to detecting ballistic missile launches and relaying combat command information for strategic nuclear forces continues to leverage both space and ground components. The Unified Space System Kupol was deployed to support this effort within Russia, building on legacy Soviet-era Oko systems.
In May 2020, Russia launched the fourth generation spacecraft 14F142 Tundra, designed for early detection of ICBM launches. This satellite operates in highly elliptical orbits, monitoring zones where launches could threaten the nation. The Tundra mission forms part of Kupol, which will eventually include several satellites in geostationary orbit. Following this launch, the constellation reached its minimum basic configuration.
The revival of space-based early warning marks a critical step in strengthening national security, enabling the Supreme Commander to issue decisive responses based on data from both space and ground-based sensors.
Note: The author’s perspective may differ from editorial positions. This article presents an analysis of public information on defense and strategic systems and should be understood as one interpretation among others.